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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Third District Juvenile
Court, in and for Summit County, State of Utah, to the Utah Court
of Appeals, and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah Code
Annotated as amended in 1990, and is consolidated with the
underlying domestic relations action filed in the Third Judicial
District

Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated
as amended in 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Has Plaintiff/Appellee caused the lower Court to

blatantly violate this Court's mandate.

The Standard of review

is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no
diference to the lower Courtfs determination.

Berube vs. Fashion

Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
2.

Do many of the FINDINGS constitute a mere "parade

of horribles11 that have no bearing whatsoever on whether the
Father destroyed a relationship with his son.

The standard of

review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness with
no deference to the lower Court's determination.

Berube vs. Fashion

Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 ( Utah 1989 ).
3.

Had the lower Court followed the instructions

regarding appropriate FINDING OF FACT, it could not have come
to the conclusion that the Feather had abandoned his child.

The

standard of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination.
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with an attorney who explained tc her that there had to be a full
year with no contact with the Father before she could have his
rights terminated.

She cut off the visitation rights altogether,

and the Father then Petitioned the District Court for specific
visitation.

She responds with a termination proceeding, which

is assigned to the Juvenile Court for determination.

This

determination was later adopted by the District Court, and an
appeal was made to the Utah Court of Appeals.
On December 9, 1991, this Court reversed and remanded
the matter to the trial Court with instructions tc make more
detailed findings, and to redetermine the question of whether
the Father ha.d abandoned the Child, and stated specifically
"We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering
and supporting the conclusion already reached."
Notwithstanding this directive, the lower Court did
exactly tha.t, and restated the Proposed Amended Findings submitted
by the Appellee to bolster and support the conclusion already
reached.
From this resubmission of FINDINGS tne Appellant once
again appeals, with a request that this time the Court reverse
and remand with instructions to set out
with the minor child.

meaningful visitation

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The Juvenile Court, Honorable Olof A. Johansson,
terminated all of the parental rights of the Appellant, and
the District Court has adopted the Juvenile Court's determination.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower Court
has ignored this Court's specific instruction not to bolster
and support the conclusion already reached.
Appellant submits that a good man}' of the FINDINGS, go
only to make the Appellant out as a "bad guy" and haive nothing
to do with the critical questions of fact that must be addressed.
The lower Court merely adopted, essentially verbatim, the
proposed amended findings submitted by the Appellee, and did so,
so long after the trial, that the lower Court perhaps, did not
recall the specific instructions mandated by this Court.
In addition the lower Court did not address the specific
issues that this Court mandated and left a good many wholly
unconsidered in the said FINDINGS, under a pretense that only the
Mother's testimony should be considered, because only the lower Court
can test the demeanor of the witness, etc.
Lastly, there is no basis at all, either in the evidence
or as to any FINDINGS, establishing that the Father destroyed the
relationship of parent-child.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court once again
reverse, and once again remand, but this time with instructions to
set out a meaningful visitation schedule for the Father.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Kim Woodward (hereinafter the Mother) and Richard
Cameron Fazzio (hereinafter the Father) met in 1985, and
began living together as husband and wife in August, 1985.
(T. 94). In February, 1986, the Mother first learned that
she was pregnant with R.A.F. (hereinafter the Child). (T.95).
The Child

was born on September 17, 1986, and the

parties got married approximately three months later,
November 3, 1986. (T. 19) At the very time that the Mother
married the Father herein, she was married to Darren Holt,
and so the Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, annulled
the marriage between the Mother and Father after about one year of
marriage,

ie: November 19, 1987. (T. 19)

The Decree of Annulment provided for the Mother to have
custody of the subject Child, and the Father would have reasonable
visitation "as the parties can agree." (T. 119).
After the Decree of Annulment was entered, up to and
including the time of trial, the Mother had moved in with her
own mother, and then moved to Springville, then moved to Riverton,
then moved to West Jordan, and then moved back to Coalville.
(T-119.) At no time did the Mother provide the Father or his
parents with her address or phone number. (T-120).
The Father testified that he had continuous contact
with the Child, and saw the Child very regularly, except for
the time that he could not find the Mother. (T-522).

The Father petitioned the District Court for specific
visitation, (T-544), after the Mother had met with an attorney
who informed her that the Father has to go a whole year without
any contact with the Child before the Mother could have the
Child declared legally abandoned.

(T-81).

The Mother had cut

off all contact between the Father and his parents with the
minor Child. (T-81).
The Fatherfs Petition for specific visitation, in
the District COurt was answered with a Petition to Terminate
the Parental Rights of the Father, and a Motion to Transfer
the same to the Juvenile Court.

The Honorable Homer F.

Wilkinson granted the request to have the Petition to Terminate
Parental Rights heard by the Juvenile Court, and provided for
the Father to have one visit a month until further order of
the Court.
The Father testified that he saw the minor Child every
time that he was allowed, except one time when in jail, and
another time when he traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada, to
Coalville, both on a Saturday and a Sunday, but -the Mother
was no where to be found. (T-300).
The Petition to Terminate the Father's interests in
the Child was heard by the Honorable Olof Johansson, in the
Third District Juvenile Court, Summit County, State of Utah,
on August 16, August 17, and August 29, 1990, and the Court
then in November, 1990, entered its ruling that the Father's
conduct has led

to a destruction of the parent/child relation-

ship, and therefore the Child had been legally abandoned by
his Father.
The Appellant then appealed the determination of the
Third District Juvenile Court in and for Summit County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Olof Johansson Presiding in Court
of Appeals No. 900626 CA, and also the adoption of the determination
by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Presiding, in Court of Appeals No. 910136-CA

which was

consolidated into the single appeal under Court of Appeals
No. 900626-CA.
This Court had the matters fully briefed and argued
and then submitted, and then made its Opinion of December 9,
1991, wherein this Court stated: "We reverse and remand for
more detailed findings."
Factually it is important to note that this Court
reversed the determination made by the Juvenile Court, as this
Court stated in its last paragraph:
"We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise
in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already
reached." Allred vs. Allred, 797 P. 2d 1108, 1112
(Utah, 1990J"; This ciourt is not altogether confident
that the trial court's final decision was correct,
particularly since the action to terminate Fazzio's
parental rights was commenced by Woodward in response
to Fazzio's petition for specific visitation. The
timely assertion of such a petition by Fazzio is
hardly the conduct of a disinterested parent,
(emphasis orginal)
On or about January 24, 1992, the Honorable Olof A.
Johansson, Judge invited both parties to submit proposed

Findings, as noted on Exhibit

A, attached hereto:

The Court has received a remand of the above case
for more specific factual findings as it relates to
paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of this Court's findings.
I, therefore, invite you, but you are not required,
to submit proposed written findings consistent with
the request of the Court of Appeals, (emphasis added)
Such findings should be provided to this Cdurt
no later than February 28, 1992. If additional time
is necessary, please advise.
Each of the parties then submitted proposed FINDINGS,
along with their respective Briefs, for the benefit of the
lower Court.
Counsel for the Mother submitted his set of Proposed
Additional Findings of Fact, on or about February 28, 1992,
as reflected as Exhibit

B, attached hereto.

However, instead of following the instructions of
the Utah Court of Appeals mandate not to engage in f,an exercise
in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached."
Counsel for the Mother submited his Proposed Findings to do
the exact opposite, and then submits the following at the end
of the same in order to make the entire appeal

a matter of

demeanor on the stand, and hence overlooking all that the Father
had to say, all that the Paternal Grandmother had to say, ana
all that the Paternal Grandfather had to say:

"CONCLUSION"
While two of the three Judges on the Court of Appeals
hearing the instant matter on appeal, seemed concerned
about this Court's final decision, it is Petitioner's
belief that if the Court provides the Findings of Fact,
clearly supported by the record, which have been propos
in the instant document, the Court of Appeals will have
a better understanding as to the nature of this case
and the reasons for this Court's decision.
As Petitioner argued in her brief on appeal:
"Never has a case more clearly demonstrated
why it is essential for an appellate court to
defer to the juvenile court on findings of
fact than the instant case. It is the position
of the Appellee (Petitioner) that Appellant
(Respondent) stated numerous falsehoods and
committed perjury during his testimony in the
trial court. This was demonstrated through crossexamination, rebuttal witnesses and evidence which
could not be overcome by Appellant (Respondent).
Futhermore, Appellee (Petitioner) maintains that
the physical manner in which the Appellant
(Respondent) and his witnesses testified in this
case was as important as the words they used
in determining their credibility. The trial judge
alone was in a position to judge the credibility
of the witnesses and his determination should
not be disturbed by this Court without a demonstration by Appellant (Respondent) that the
Findings are against the weight of the evidence
and thus clearly erroneous. State in Interest of
P.K. and M.H. vs. Harrison, 783 P. 2d 565, 570
(Utah App. 1989.)"
Petitioner/Appellee's Brief at 21.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of February, 1992
/s/
LARRY R. KELLER
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

Thereafter, on or about April 30, 1992, the Honorable
Olof A. Johansson, Judge sent the letter attached hereto as
Exhibit

C , which states:
Do not give up hope. I am making serious attempts
at providing more detailed findings in the above
case, in between my regular caseload.
Each of your briefs are extremely well done and
very helpful. I thank you for them.

Finally, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson, Judge,
submitted his AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, on June 15, 1992,
some six months after the directive from the Court of Appeals,
and the express mandate not to engage in "an exercise in bolstering
and supporting the conclusion already reached."
A copy of the said AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, are
attached hereto, as Exhibit

D , so that this Court can see

the almost verbatim duplication of Mr. Keller's PROPOSED
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, as if the lower Court considered
matter for six months and then blindly copied the PROPOSED
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, in an obvious effort to make
the entire trial a matter of demeanor on the stand, so that
only the trial judge can have a clue as to what the evidence
is .
From this bold

"exercise in bolstering and supporting

the conclusion already reached,ff
appeals.

the Appellant once again

EVENTS AT A GLANCE
May 24, 1985 Cameron and Kim meet for the first time (T-94)
August,

1985 Cameron and Kim begin living together (T-94)

February, 1986 Kim learns shefspregnant with R.A.F. (T-94)
September 17, 1986 - R.A.F is born (T-96)
November 3, 1986 - Kim and Cameron get married (T-96)
September, 1987 - Kim and Cameron seperated (T-96)
November 19, 1987 - Marriage Annulled - (T-96)
November, 1987 - July, 1989 - Kim moved to mother's, then her
own apartment, to Coalville, to Springville, to
Riverton, to West Jordan, to Coalville (T-119)
1987 - 1988 - Father has visitation as parties can agree (T-74)
October 1988 - July 1989 - Visitation via Grandparents (T82,104,105)
March 25, 1988 - Kim marries Third Husband - Mark Woodward (T-83)
October 1988 - Kim consults attorney about cutting Father off (T-81)
October 1989 - Kim terminates contact altogether with R.A.F. (T-Z74)
October 1989 - Father Petitions for Specific visitation
January 1990 - Mother petitions to terminate parental rights
August 1990 - Trial on termination issue
November 1990 - FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and ORDER
December 1990 - Appeal to Court of Appeals
December 1991 - Court of Appeals - reverse and remand
June, 1992 - Amended FINDINGS submitted
July, 1992 - Notice of Appeal filed
August, 1992 - Petition for Writ of Mandamus
September, 1992 - Petition for Writ of Mandamus denied

ARGUMENT NO. ONE

PLAINTIFF HAS CAUSED THE LOWER COURT TO BLATANTLY
VIOLATE THIS COURT'S MANDATE.

When this matter was before this Court in the prior
Appeal, this Court made the reverse and remand with perfectly
clear instructions.
As noted on page 479 of the Opinion, this Court not
only stated in unequivocal terms, that the reverse and remand
was not to be "merely an

exercise in bolstering and supporting

the conclusion already reached "

this Court refered to a 1990

case, on what was to be completed and why.
In the case of Allred vs. Allred,

cited by the Court,

which is found at 797 P. 2d 1108, (Utah App. 1990), the Court
of Appeals was considering a situation where the lower court
had set child support at $100.00 per month for the month,
without making appropriate findings of fact to support the
same.
The Appellate Court was trying to determine how the
lower Court arrived at the determination, and after a thorough
review of the record on appeal, the Court concluded both that
the determination was incorrect as well as the fact that there
was no connection between the evidence and the findings reached
by the trial court.
Hence, the Couit reversed the determination because it
was an incorrect determination, and then remanded the (Same .

to follow specific instructions on how to arrive at the correct
determination.
This is exactly what this Court has done in the case
at bar.
This Court stated that the determination that the
father had abandoned was not supported by the evidence, when
considering only one bit of evidence, ie: the timely assertion
of a petition to determine his specific visitation.

Note

on page 479of the Opinion:
This Court is not altogether confident that the
trial court's final decision was correct, particularly
since the action to terminate Fazzio's parental rights
was commenced by Woodward in response to Fazzio's
petition for specific visitation. The timely assertion
of such a petition by Fazzio is hardly the conduct of
a disinterested parent. (emphasis original)

Not only did the Court of Appeals, make it abundantly
clear that the determination was incorrect when considering
only one factor alone, the Court of Appeals made very specific
instructions on what was to be consiaered in the determination
of the abandonment issue.
On page 478 of the Opinion, this Court instructs the
lower court on what is to be in the Findings:
The trial court's findings of fact should resolve
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The
findings should set forth, with as much precision as
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the child
during particular periods; the length of each of the
visits; the number of visits Woodward intentionally
prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child support,
either personally or through his parents; the number
and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child and the
occasions on which he gave them; and the specific

statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate
Fazzio's intent to either accept or disregard his
oblgations as a parent (e;g;, instances of appellant
performing child care functions like changing his
diaper or feeding him, denying that the child was
his responsibility, etc.,).
Further,the findings should explicitly address the
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazzio's
ability to maintain contact with the child, the
effect Fazzio's living and working outside of Utah
had on his visitation, the manner and effect of any
refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge
his paternity, and any other factors bearing on
whether Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to
such an extent that the parent-child relationship
was destroyed.
Appellant respectfully submits that instead of addressing
the Findings of Fact, showing the specific detail and hox* the
ultimate conclusion was reached by the lower Court, as instructed
by the Appellate Court, the lower Court merely adopted
the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT proposed by the
Mother's Counsel, making the clear directions of this Court a
mockery, as if every bit of evidence in the lower Court that
supports the notion that the Father had not abandoned the child,
is a matter of credibility, where only the trial judge can see
things mysteriously unknown to the Appellate Court, because
the Appellate Court only has the hard, cold record.
Hence, any testimony that the Father may have on the issue
is

to

be wholly and completely disregarded because only the

trial court can test the demeanor of the witness and determine
issues of credibility, etc.

Hence, any testimony that the Paternal Grandmother
may have on the issue is to be wholly and completely disregarded
because only the trial court can test the demeanor of the witness
and determine issues of credibility, etc.
Hence, any testimony that

the Paternal Grandfather

may have on the issue is to be wholly and completely disregarded
because only the trial court can test the demeanor of the
witness and determine the issue of credibility, etc.
Appellant submits that what is even more significant, is
the notion that the lower court can wholly and completely
disregard all of the toys, and gifts and articles of clothing
produced in open court, showing what was supplied by the Father
for the child, as well as all of the many pictures, some of
which were blown-up, of the times the Father spent with the
Child, and lastly the tape recordings of the minor child's
own voice, regarding the Father.
Surely one

can not argue that the toys, gifts,

clothing, pictures, tapes, etc., are of such a nature that only
the trial judge can determine their demeanor and credibility
on the witness stand.
Notwithstanding, under the guise of a demeanor
argument the lower Court totally disregarded the same as nonexistant.

Appellant respectfully submits that this Court reverse
the lower Court once again, but this time with instructions
to set out a meaningful visitation schedule for the father.

ARGUMENT NO. TWO
MANY FINDINGS CONSTITUTE A MERE "PARADE OF HORRIBLES"
THAT HAS NO BEARING WHATSOEVER ON WHETHER THE FATHER
DESTROYED A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON.

Appellant respectfully submits that at the time of
trial Counsel objected to the

admisability of certain evidence

as having no relevance whatsoever, and was merely submitted
to make the Appellant out as a bad guy.
Now, the lower Court has endorsed the same, as somehow
relevant to whether a Father destroyed a relationship with his
son, showing just how much the lower Court was mislead.
Appellant submits that the following have absolutely
no bearing whatsoever on the question:
Finding 7(a) states: Respondent admitted that he
urged Petitioner to get an abortion when he" first
learned she was pregnant with R.A.F. Respondent urged
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one
occasion.
Finding 7(e) states: On one occasion, Respondent
grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had her on the
floor and was beating her head into the floor when
she started calling for Christopher (her son from
a prior marriage) to run over to the neighbors and
have them call the police. As soon as he moved,
Respondent said ff(I)f anybody moves off that couch,
I111 kill her.M R.A.F was one of the two children
present on the couch observing this physical
abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her.
Both R.A.F and Christopher were terrified and they

were taken by the police to the YWCA after this
incident.
Finding 11(a) states: Petitioner had a child from
a previous marriage, Darren Christopher Holt (DOB
2/13/83), who lived with the Petitioner at the* time
she was married to Respondent. Christopher was
approximately four years old during that period.
Finding 11(b) states: During the course of the marriage,
Petitioner and her children, including R.A.F, were
regularly subjected to mental and physical threats
and abuse by Respondent.
Finding 11(c) states: Respondent admitted during
the course of the marriage that he "smacked Kim" and
that he did not make sure either R.A.F., or the child
Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her.
Finding 11(d) states: Petitioner talked Respondent
into seeking marriage counseling during the marriage
but not only did his abuse of her not change, Respondent
actually beat her the day of the counseling because
he didn't like the things she said to the counselor;
Finding 11(e) states: Darren Holt testified that his
son, Christopher, told him during his visitations that
he was terrified of Respondent, and that Respondent
had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit
him a number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher
told him Respondent at one point drove Petitioner
and Christopher out of the Petitioner's home with a
gun and told them that if they came back, he (Respondent)
would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by
Petitioner;
Finding 11(f) states: When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent
about this abuse of his son, Christopher, Respondent
replied: " . . . While Christopher is in my house, I
will treat him the way I want." This testimony was
corroborated by Petitioner who described respondent's
attitude toward Christopher as "mean and hateful ...
. . . cruel
"
Finding 11(g) states: On one occasion, Respondent
grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had her on the floor
and was beating her head onto the floor when she started
calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors
and have them call the police. Petitioner testified
that as Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f
anybody moves off that couch I'll kill her."
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the
couch observing this physical, abuse of his mother
and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher

were terrified and they were taken by the police
to the YWCA after the incident.
As to the finding #7(a), Appellant submits the Child
surely would have no knowledge of abortion unless his Mother
spent hours and hours with pictures and graphics, etc., and
even to this day would be too young to relate with the same.
As noted by the Court in its Opinion at page 477,
The Wulffenstein test for determining abandonment in
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements.
First, the party seeking termination must prove the
"the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard
for his or her parental obligations11 to the child.
Tiinperly, 750 P. 2d at 1236. Second, the party
must demonstrate that thelfdisregard led to the
destruction of the parent-child relationship." Id.,
Wulffenstein, 560 P. 2d at 334. Both of these
elements must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. See Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
769 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P. 2d 1158, 1159
(Utah 1983).
Appellant submits that his finding regarding the Father
urging the Mother to get an abortion "on more than one occasion"
only bears out the Appellant prior argument that the lower
Court blindly rubberstamped the parade of horribles that the
Mother's Counsel submitted in his PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

As to Finding 7(e) one would assume that this would
be very significant in references to the issues before this
Court, until one learned that the child was eleven months old
at most when this incident allegedly occurred.

The child could

not talk, and could not run for help, because he was so young
he could not even stand.

Note the transcript at page 30, with

the Mother herself testifying that the Child was only eleven
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Appellant submits that this again can not possibly
bear on "the parent's conduct evidences a conscious disregard
for his or her parental obligations to the child and that
disregard led to the destruction of the parent-child
relationship.ff
This is evidence however, Appellant submits, that
the lower Court blindly rubber stamped the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT, submitted by the Mother's counsel.
Appellant respectfully submits that essentially all
of Finding #11, further confirms the notion that the lower
Court blindly rubber stamped the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
OF FACT, submitted by the Mother's Counsel.
There can be no question that

Counsel submitted his

"parade of horribles" regarding the Father, and the lower Court
endorsed the whole of the same as the basis for abandonment,
when the same is not even relevant in the xrase.
The lower Court even discounted the same when it stated
"Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this case,
there

is evidence...."
The Court shold have actually stated, "Although

neither helpful or relevent in this case, there is evidence..."
as the only bearing that the same could have on the question
of abandonment is that the Father "was a bad guy."

Then from

that conclude that "bad guys shouldhave their parental rights
terminated.Tf

Appellant respectfully submits that all of Finding #11
should be disregarded:
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling
in this case, there is evidence that during the period
of time that Petitioner and Respondent lived together
Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a prior
marriage, and was emotionally abusive to the minor
child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the subject
of this action.
(a) Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage,
Darren Christopher Holt (DOB 2/13/83), who lived
with Petitioner at the time she was married to
Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years
old during thac period;
(b) During the course of the marriage, Petitioner
and her children, including R.A.F., were regularly
subjected to mental and physical threats and abuse
by Respondent;
(c) Respondent admitted during the course of the
marriage that he Msmacked KimM and that he did not
make sure that either R.A.F. or the child Christopher
were out of the roou when he slapped her.
(d) Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage
counseling during the marriage; but not only did his
abuse of her not change, Respondent actually beat her
the day of counseling because he didn't like the things
she said to the Counselor;
(e) Darren Holt testified that his, own son, Christopher
told him during his visitations that he was terrified
of Respondent, and that Respondent had threatened him
(Christopher) with a knife and hit him a number of times.
Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him Respondent
at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of
Petitioner's home with a gun and told them that if they
came back, he (Respondent) would kill them. This
testimony was corroborated by Petitioner;

(f) When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this
abuse of his son, Christopher, Respondent replied
" . . . While Christopher is in my house, I will treat
him the way I want. .f! this testimony was corroborated
by Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward
Christopher as "mean and hateful . . .cruel . . ."
(g) One one occasion, Respondent grabbed Petitioner
by the hair and had her on the floor and was beating
her head into the floor when she started calling for
Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have them
call the police. Petitioner testified that as
Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f anybody moves,
off that couch, I'll kill her." R.A.F. was one of
the two children present on the couch observing
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat
to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified'
and they were both taken by the police to the YWCA
after this incident.
As noted

above Finding 7(e) and 11(g) are identical,

and further bears out the notion that they were blindly
rubber stamped.
More importantly, as noted above the child was only
eleven months old at most, when any of this allegedly took
place. (T. 30)
As noted throughout the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
OF FACT, submitted by Appellee to the lower Court,

and then

endorsed essentially verbatim by the lower Court, that certain
testimony was "unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable"
the Finding that Appellant did

anything improper to the

step son Christopher is completely contrary to the sworn
statement made by the Mother, when challeged by her former
Husband Darren Holt for custody of Christopher. Note Exhibit
18, wherein

the Mother stated:

8. All allegations contained in plaintiff's
affidavit regarding defendant's boyfriend's
(Cameron) alleged threats to the minor child
are false, and in complete error. Defendant's
boyfriend has a strong and supportive relationship
with the minor child. (Christopher)

However, the trial judge was so incensed by the
alleged conduct of the Father of the child, he made findings
beyond what was even claimed by the Petitioner.
At page 655 of the transcript, Counsel for the Appellee,
fortifies his position through the trial, by giving the
following statement in closing argument:
. . . .and his response to the problem that existed
in that family > Judge, was abuse and violence,
physical and emotional abuse to his stepson, abuse of
his wife and while he never abused the child, and
we've never claimed that he did, when he was abusing
his wife in front of the child, when he was abusing
the wife with the child in her arms, as has been
testified to, that's as close as it comes to abuse of
the child himself.
The findings by the Judge is that the Father of the
child was emotionally abusive to the child, something well
beyond even the claims of the Appellee.

Appellee's Counsel

stated that in reference to emotional abuse, "we've never
claimed that he did."
Two parents not getting along, while one of the parents
is holding the minor child, would not amount to "emotional
abuse."
Appellant respectfully submits that if the basis for
terminating the parental rights of the Appellant is found at
all in Finding of Fact #11, then this Court should reverse the
lower Court and remand with instructions to immediately ^et

out a meaningful visitation schedule for the Father.

ARGUMENT NO. THREE
HAD THE LOWER COURT FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS
REGARDING APPROPRIATE FINDINGS IT COULD NOT
HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FATHER HAD
ABANDONED HIS CHILD. ,

Appellant submits that this Court was very clear
with its instructions as to what the lower Court was to do,
in order to reach the ultimate determination of whether the
Father had abandoned his child.
Appellant submits that had the lower Court addressed
the specific areas in the new findings, the lower Court could
not, based upon the evidence, rule that the Father had abandoned
his Son.
At page 478 & 479 of the Opinion this Court stated:
There was conflicting testimony about (1) the frequently
ar.d duration of Fazziofs visits with the Child, (2)
his treatment of the child during those visits; (3)
Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from visiting
with the child; (4) Fazziofs payment of child support
and (5) Fazzio!s provision of gifts to the child -all facts crucial to the validity of the court's
ultimate decision that Fazzio-s conduct had destroyed
the parent-child relationship.

The findings should set forth, with as much precision
as possible (6) the number of times Fazzio visited
the child during particular periods; (7) the length
of each of the visits; (8) the number of visits
Woodxvard intentionally prevented; (9) the sums

Fazzio provided as child support, either personally
or through his parents; (10) the number and type of
gifts Fazzio gave te the child and (11) the occasions
on which he gave them; (12) and the specific statements,
acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazziofs intent
to either accept or disregard his obligations as a
parent (e.g. instances of appellant performing
child care functions like changing his diaper
or feeding him, denying that the child was his
responsibility, etc.,).
Futher, the findings should explicitly address (13)
the impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazziofs
ability to maintain contact with the Child, (14)
the effect Fazziofs living and working outside
Utah had on his visitation; (15) the manner and effect
of any refusal on Fazziofs part to legally acknowledge
his paternity , and (16) any other factors bearing
on whether Fazzic consciously disregarded the. child
to such an extent that the parent-child relationship
was destroyed.
As already noted by this Court in this case when on
appeal before, at page 477 this Court stated:
The *Wulffensfgin test for determining abandonment in
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements.
First, the party seeking termination must prove that
M
the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard,
for his or her parental obligations" to the child.
Timperly, 750 P. 2d at 1236. Second, the party
must demonstrate that the "disregard led to the
destruction of the parent-child relationship."
Id.; Wulffenstein, 560 P. 2d at 334. Both of
these elements must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. See Santosky vs. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P. 2d
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983).
At the outset of this argument it is critical to note that
the burden is on the Mother to establish both elements, and
therefore the father has no burden whatsoever.
Equally significant is the standard of proof, ie: by
clear and convincing evidence - the hignest standard known
to law, short of being charged with a crime.

With that background, the Appellant respectfully
submits that the Appellee completely failed both as to burden
of proof and the standard of proof, because the Mother herself
stated that she had no idea of what contact, etc., that the
Father had with the Child, when the child was picked up and
taken to his folks.
On page 104 and 105 of the transcript, with the Mother
testifying she stated on cross examination:
Q.

Now, I want you to zero in on my question, please.
Do you — have you observed that Cameron is not
there seeing the child during the times that Richaid
and Stephanie have picked the child up and brought
him back?

A.

No, sir.

Ifm not there.

With very few exceptions the sole basis for many of
the FINDINGS OF FACT, was exclusively the Mother's testimony,
yet she admitted on Cross-examination, that she did not know
what contacts, etc., were going on between the Child and his
Father when the Child left her home for visitation.
As a matter of law, she must show the following items,
and she carries the burden of proof, and in addition the level
of proof must be clear and convincing evidence, yet she admits
when cornered, that she lias no basis at all for her testimony
regarding no contact, no gifts, no bonding, etc.
As to the specific instructions given by this Court, in
this very action, the Appellant submits the following:
1.

"the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits

with the child."

As to this issue, the Court made FINDING OF FACT #7(g):
g. Although Respondent came around four or five
times from the date of their separation in September
of 1987, through September of 1988, he spent very
little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988,
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone,
nor contacted the child;
The support for this Finding is found on page 75,
wherein the Mother stated when questioned by her Attorney:
Q.

You said that he came around four or five times
until September of 1988; is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

To your knowledge, when was the next time he
personally saw R.A.F., to your knowledge?

A.

In March of 1990.

Q*

In March of 1990 . Okay, And how do you know he
personally saw R.'A.F. , at that time?

A.

Because we went into Court and the Court said for
him to see him tomorrow.

In marshalling all of the facts in support of this
FINDING, the Court should know that the Mother made similar
statements at pages 72 through 74, however, the sole basis for
the said FINDING, is from the Mother only, and the statements
are essentially the same.
Appellant submits that this FINDING OF FACT, is wholly
unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, as a careful review
of the question by her own Counsel, states twice in the same
question, "to your knowledge?11
The only evidence

coming from this testimony by the

Mother is that she has no knowledge, just as she testified on
Cross Examination at page 104 and 105.

She just doesn't

know one way or another.
With the burden of proof with the Mother, and the
standard of proof being b}^ clear and convincing evidence,
the

Mother

has nothing to substantiate this FINDING.

On the otherhand, as this Court noted in this case
as page 477:
To succeed in challenging the findings, appellant
must prove they are clearly erroneous, i.e., against
the clear weight of the evidence. State ex rel. J.R.T.
vs. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1988).
At page 228 of the transcript, with the Appellant's
Mother testifying on direct examination, she stated:
Q.

I see. Did you see a pattern at that time of
visitation between Cameron and R.A.F.?

A.

Definitely.

Q.

And can you -- was that ever other week, or what
did you see?

A.

When Cameron -- when they were first divorced, or
separated until the annulment, we were seeing
R.A.F. every weekend, either at our home or Cameron
would pick him up, and that went on for a period
of at least six months, and then it became every
other weekend.

Q.

Okay. So from September of 1986, for, are you
saying another six months from that point on?

A.

I believe it started October of f86 and we saw
him regularly, at first, every weekend, then every
other weekend, up until Kim sent us the -- gave
us the note saying we couldn't see R.A.F. any more,
In October of 89 f . We saw him fairly regularly
for three years. And during that period of time,
Cameron saw R.A.F. regularly.

Again on direct examination, the Appellant's mother
testified, beginning at page 307:

Q.

And now I asked you in reference to visitation,
you've talked about a series of times that
Cameron and R.A.F. were together and you were
present. Have you told us about all of those?

A.

Not ail of them.

Q.

Okay. Give me an idea of the quantity and quality
of that, too, please.

A.

Between f87 and f 90, it was continuous. The quality
time, I think was quality time. They shared a
lot together and they had a good time with each
other. They had a loving, caring relationship,
good rapport, it was a father-son quality, period.

On direct examination, the Father testified regarding
the visits with the minor child at page 512:
Q.

How -- how often did you see the child when you
returned back from Cheyenne?

A.

When I came back from Cheyenne, it was on a
weekly basis and it was every weekend, I had
R.A.F. two, three days, sometimes, sometimes three,
usually two, all of them overnight, generally
at my dad's house, sometimes at my grandmother's
house where I was living, and Kim was quite liberal
with the visitation.

Again on direct examination, the Father testified regarding
the

visits with the minor child at page 518:
Q.

Okay. How often did your child, say, from
December '87 up to the Child's birthday in 1988?

A.

It was, I believe it was weekly, every week. It
may have been every two weeks, but I think it was
more likely weekly then.

Lastly, the Father testified on page 526 of the
transcript as follows:
Q.

Has there ever been a time to this day that you
have not opted to visit with R.A.F.?

A.

No, I -- no, I visit R.A.F. every chance I get. I
will -- like I drive hundreds of miles to be with
my son. He means the world to me. I cannot stress
how much my son means to me.

As a result, Appellant submits that there is no evidence
to support the specific

FINDING, and further that it is "against

the clear weight of the evidence."
Futhermore, the Appellant submits that in reference
to "the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits with the Child"
there can be no question that the Father saw the Child regularly,
except as prevented by the Mother as will be discussed below,
and that his visits included the entire weekends, and sometimes
a full three days at a time.
Appellant submits, in reference to the second item,
that was to be determined by the lower Court:
2.

Fazzio's treatment of the child during those visits"

the lower Court made FINDING

OF FACT #7(u)

u. Even though Respondent was provided with courtordered visitation after the filing of the instant
lawsuit, he did not make an effort to spend much time
with the child during the court-ordered visitations.
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and stepfather of Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present
husband, testified that after the May 1990, courtordered visitation with Respondent he asked R.A.F.
about the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone
to the park. When Mr. Kresser asked him if Cameron
(respondent) was there with him, R..A.F. stated "no,
he was sleeping."

The support for the particular incident is found
when Ken Kresser testified on direct examination on page 173
of the transcript.
Appellant would not perhaps deny that after he had
driven all night to be with his son, that he did in fact take
a nap, while other members

of the Appellant's family spent

some time in the park across the street from Appellant's parent's
home.
In fact, even if this were not an isolated incident,
Appellant submits that it surely is no basis for the Court to
find that, "Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered
visitation after the filing of the instant lawsuit,

he did

not make an effort to spend much time with the child during the
court-ordered visitation."
If one were to look at the situation objectively, the
reasoning of the Court is as follows:

Even though you worked

in Las Vegas until the end of the day of Friday, and then left
right after work and drove all the way
through

to Salt Lake City, Utah

the night, since you took a nap on Saturday, you were

not making an effort to see the child for court-ordered visitation.
Appellant submits that the reasoning is without merit,
as the only reason he would be coming to Salt Lake City, Utah,
from Las Vegas, for the short stay, as he had to be back to work
in Las Vegas on Monday morning, was so that he could spend the
few precious moments with his son.
The whole basis for this FINDING, is based upon Ken

Kresser testifying as to what the child said.
The child was born on September 17, 1986, and this
occured during the month of Hay, 1990, so the child was just
over three and one-half years of age when questioned by his
Step-father's Step father.
Appellant submits that even if the child were old
enough

to perceive in reality what was going on, he surely

had been through enough of the family gatherings where the Father
was put down, to know what the Step-father's Step-father wanted
him to say.

Note Finding #7(h) regarding how the child was

drilled after every visit.
Appellant submits that such questionable evidence
is a far cry from any clear and convincing level of proof,
and is clearly against the great weight of the evidence as found
in

the transcript beginning at page 223 with the Appellant's

Mother on direct examination:
Q.

Did you see him care for the child on that
occasion, other then just play with R.A.F.?

A.

I >think we cared for Pv.A.F. most of the time
because we were there.

Q.

Have you ever seen him change the diaper of the
child other than in the hospital?

A.

Absolutely. At my home. Many times. He would
come and R.A.F. would need to be changed and he
would change him, no question.

Q.

Can you give me a ball park figure of how many times?

A.

Oh, every time he needed to be changed; however
many times an infant needs to be changed when hefs
at his grandmontherfs: 20, 30.

Q.

What about other needs when the child was there
at your home, other than change the diaper?

A.

As I mentioned before, Cameron would feed him.
I
know of several occasions at our home when Cameron
would bring him over to visit, it would be dinnertime,
Cameron would sit down and feed him. At my motherin-law's, we would go over to visit when Cameron
would always prepare R.A.F.'s food and feed him
himself. He never expected anyone else to do
that for R.A.F. He -- I know that he bathed R.A.F.,
got him ready for bed.

Again on page 227 of the transcript with the Appellant!s
Mother testifying on direct examination:
Q.

When you say he'd play with the child, what do
you mean?

A.

When R.A.F. was really little, Cameron would get
down on the floor, >play around with him, you know,
play with him, play with his toys. As he got older
they played with trucksra lot down on the floor.
We have a park directly across the street from
our home, Cameron takes him to the park, they'd
play on the playground there. Sometimes Cameron
would take him for an ice cream cone.

Again with the Appellant's Mother testifying on direct
examination, at page 265 is the following:
R.A.F. would sit in Cameron's lap, they would sit
on the floor head-to-head, eye-to-eye, down on the
floor playing. They had a very close relationship. When
-- very often, Cameron would get R.A.F. ready for bed,
put his night clothes on him. We had kind of a little
ritual at our house. With my children, after they had bathed
and gotten ready * for bed, it was quiet play time
to get ready to go to bed, rather than rev them up
so they wouldn't go to bed, and they would sit and
do that, sometimes, R.A.F. would fall asleep curled
up cuddled next to his father on the loveseat in our
family room.

Again on page 293 of the transcript with the Appellantfs
mother still testifying on direct examination is the following:
Q.

And then taking it up there in May, did yoa
observe Cameron and R.A.F. play with the toys?

A.

They spent most of the time in the house playing
on the floor of our family room with that truck
and the large brown one that Cameron Had given
him previously. The two of them played with that
almost exclusively. There was a period of time
during the two-day period where they were over
in the park on the slide playing. They played
almost exclusively with those two trucks. They
would — R.A.F. liked the large car carrier, it's
about this large and its has three smaller cars
in it. He liked to delegate who plays with which
car, he has to have a certain one and then somebody
else can have the others. The trailers are removeable
and he would play with -- switch the trailers,
they would switch trucks and trade off. R.A.F.
would try to stick the truck that fits in the car
carrier into the large -- the large one was a van
type, and he got very frustrated because they
wouldn't fit, they were too wide, so we got other
trucks and they played with those as well, putting
them in and out of the van.

In addition to the foregoing, Exhibit 12, which was
admitted into evidence, was referred to by the Appellant's
Mother at page 394:
We had gone -- this is just a little ways away from
our house. We had gone to feed ducks. There was
my husband, myself, my younger son, Brian, R.A.F. and
Cameron. I had taken a loaf of bread and we were throwing
bread into the ducks, and R%A.F. came over -- Cameron
went over and sat down to feed the ducks and R.A.F.
took a piece of bread and went over and sat in his
dad's lap and they fed the ducks together.

The Appellant's Father testified on direct examination
at page 418 and 419 of the transcript as follows:
Q.

Have you seen R.A.F. take care -- excuse me,
Cameron take care of R.A.F. when they're
together?

A.

Yes, I have. Right from the time when R.A.F. was
little, when Cameron would bring him over, you
know, it was a big deal again, between Cameron
and I to -- if the baby needed to be changed,
I says, huh uh, I went through this and now it's
your turn, and he'd take him in, change him,
bathe him at night, put his pajamas on him,
sit and rock with him sometimes at night before
bed.

Not only did the Appellant, his Mother and his Father
each testify as to the treatment by the Appellant of the child
during the many visits with the child, Appellant called Jerald
Alvey, a person who worked with Cameron in Wyoming, who testified
at page 622, on a visit to Wyoming with the child:
And he -- he brought him in and he had a little
chocolate on his face, he was eating some chocolate,
and came in and Cameron went and changed his diaper
and took care of him and everything.
Appellant submits that the lower Court merely rubber
stamped what Appellee's Counsel sutmitted, regarding what
Appellant did during his visitation with the child, and endorsed
a single time when Cameron took a nap, after driving all nignt
to be with his child.

The lower Court seemed to totally overlook the fact
that Cameron had driven all the way from Las Vegas, after
getting off work on Friday, and driving all night, just to
spend a Saturday and Sunday with his boy, when it concludes,
lf

he did not make an effort to spend much time with the child

during the court-ordered visitations" merely because he took
a nap on Saturday.
Appellant submits that FINDING 7(u) regarding this
isolated incident, as portrayed by a three and a half year old
child, as the total reference to the treatment of the child
during the visits,

can not reach the clear and convincing

level to conclude that the Father abandoned his child, and is without question

against the clear weight of the evidence.

Appellant submits in reference to the third item,
that was to be determined by the lower Court , the lower Court
made no FINDING whatsoever, and totally ignored this directive
by the Court
3.

Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from visiting

the child.
As to the evidence regarding the same, the Mother of
the child herself testified that she had been to see an attorney
who stated that she had to have a whole year go by without
Cameron seeing the child, as noted on page 78 and 79 of the
transcript:

Q.

Were there -- did there come a time when his
parents, Dick and Stephanie Fazzio, asked to
visit with the Child?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And did you allow that?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When was that that you recall that they first made
that request?

A.

It was after Cameron -- not too long after
Cameron quit seeing him.

Q.

Which would have been not too long after --

A.

So it would have been --

Q.

-- September of '38?

A.

It would have been October of '88.

Q.

Did you know whether or not you had any legal
obligation to allow them to see the child?

A.

Well, Cameron hadn't been around, so we had talked
to an attorney about terminating -- not you, another
attorney -- about terminating parental rights, and
he said a year had to go by. And I told her we had
been allowing the grandparents visitation and she
said that was good, if the parents were seeing -the grandparents were seeing him and the parent
still wasn't, that was very good.

As noted in the Decree of Annulment, the Appellant is
entitled to visitation as the parties can agree.

This Court

has once before commented on this provision at page 475, in
footnote #1, wherein this Court stated:
"Such a provision is not terribly helpful to parties,
like these whose breakups is accompanied by considerable
rancor."

Appellant submits that not only was such an arrangment
ladened with trouble, it literally rose to the level of having
to get a court order to spend time with the child.
This was borne out, somewhat inadvertangly by the StepFather's Step-Father's testimony, at page 176,.wherein Mr.
Kresser stated:
Q.

So it's in 1990 that you observed that he was
unruly?

A.

Right. After he started having visitation rights
because of the court orders this year.

Appellant submits that there is no question that he
literally

had to petition the Court for specific visitation

so that the Mother could no longer prevent the Father from having
a meaningful relationship with his Child.
It is clear that the Mother went to her Attorney,
Terry Christiansen, in Summit County, and inquired what would
need to be done, to cut Cameron off from seeing his child.
She is informed that it takes a whole year of no
visitation, and so she then prepares Exhibit #4, and gives it
to the Grandparents when they return the child for Cameron in
October 1939.
The Appellant's Mother testified in reference to Exhibit
#4, at page 274, wherein she stated:

Q.

Now, you were telling me about, and I didn't
mean to get a field; you were talking about the
soccer ball. Did -- did you -- tell me what you
observed in reference to Cameron and R.A.F. after
the time that you just made reference to, in
reference to the soccer ball in October of 1989.

A.

After October of f89 we did not see R.A.F. again
until Commissioner Peuler made the ruling, and
we saw him in March.

Q.

Did you receive a letter from Kim in reference to
the visitation?

A.

She gave me a letter, October, when we returned
R.A.F. to her.

She then goes on and explains Exhibit #4, which was
from Kim, terminating all visitation with the minor Child, which
gives rise to the Petition for specific visitation filed in
October of 1989.
The Mother was successful in keeping the Child from
his Father and his parents, from that time in October as noted
above to March of 1990.
Appellant and his family had been totally cut off from
contact with the Child, and so they spend their Christmas with
this Child in Mardh.
The Appellant's Mother describes the occasion and what
occurred thereafter beginning at page 291:
Cameron gave R.A.F. another huge -- another -- one of
his fleet Cameron's building, it's a large white
diesel. We have him campanion trucks to the one that
we gave him on his birthday, we gave him the Tonka dump
truck for Christmas, we gave him a large grader and
a backhoe.

Q.

Does he take these home with him, to Kim's house?

A.

He tried to take the truck home.

Q.

Which truck?

A.

The large white one.

Q.

From? .

A.

From Cameron.

Q.

Okay, What happened?

A.

That was in March. He wanted to take the truck
home, he took some candy and there was a gift from
my mother-in-law that she sent up from California,
it was a little black jogging suit. We drove up,
we got out of the car, R.A.F. was eating the candy,
I was carrying the jump suit in a box, my husband
was carrying a white truck. We got to the door
and Mark stopped us and he said, "Our attorney
said we can't take anything from you people."
And he put the truck down on the porch, my husband
picked it up and said, this doesn't belong to any
of us, it's R.A.F.'s. We didn't give him all these
things, some of these came from his great-grandmother,
and Mark wouldn't let him have it. Took it back -took the truck, you know, wouldn't take - made
Dick keep it. R.A.F. started to cry.
Kim came running out of the house screaming at the
top of her lungs, this is a Kim I have never seen,
telling Dick, grow up, Dick, just grow up, Dick,
and stop telling -- calling Mark -- or telling
R.A.F. things about Mark and me. And I looked
at her, and I said, Kim, that might be your style,
but we have never, never done that.
By this time, R.A.F. was almost hysterical, he
was crying, he was sobbing, we thought it was
best to leave. I told R.A.F., don't worry, R.A.F.
we'll -- Grandma will keep your truck at her house
and you can play with it when you come down and
we left.

And as we were leaving, Mark came, took the candy
out of R.A.F.'s hand, he was chewing on a piece
of candy he ripped it out of his hand and
gave it back to me and says, here, we can't
keep this, either, and I just took it and left.
As this Court will note, the trial of this action began
in August of 1990, and so the opportunity to see the child
immediately before the trial, should the Court want to talk
to the minor child, would be a most critical time for the Mother
to prevent the Father from seeing the child.

This is especially

so, since the Father only gets to see the child for one weekend
per month.
For this July visit, as with each visit, the Appellant
must drive to Salt Lake City, Utah, from Las Vegas, Nevada, after
work on Friday.

This means that he will drive essentially all

night long to arrive in time to get some rest before going
to Coalville to pick up his Child first thing, Saturday morning.
Appellant did just that and arrived in Coalville at
the scheduled time to be with his Child only to come upon a vacant
home, as neither the Child nor any other member of his family
was there.
Appellant was devastated, not only because of the
great disappointment of not being with his child, but concerned
about the upcoming trial where he had not seen his boy since
June, and the Court would be deciding the matter in August.
Appellant was wholly unable to locate the Child or the
Mother and returned to Salt Lake City, on Saturday.
Then again on Sunday, he drove all the way to Coalville
to see his boy, but again he left empty handed, and returned

to Salt Lake and ultimately Las Vegas, after making this extreme
effort to see his

Child, and not even getting the chance tc-

talk to him on the phone.
following.

Note the transcript at page 300 and

Also note page 526 and following where the Father

testified on direct examination:
Q.

Tell me -- let me just cut right through to the
bottom line if I might. Tell me about what you
did in July of this year to see the Child.

A.

July of this year? Oh, God. In July of this year,
1 came down, I work all day and then I drive all
night and then we drive again up to Coalville
and we get there and they're gone. Nobody is there.
I drive -- drive and drive and drive. I was very
disappointed, extremely disappointed.

Q.

What did you do?

A.

I drove around looked for Kim. I didn't -wasn't a lot I could do. I looked, I called,
and nobody seemed to know where they were.

The Father goes on through the next few page of transcript
and explains what efforts he made on Sunday, as well, to be
with his son.
This very specific visitation time was ordered by the
Court, and reflects, perhaps with greater importance, the struggle
that the Father had to visit with his Child, as the visitation
after the Annulment was "as the patties can agree," whereas
this visitation was by Order of the Court, "like it or not."
At trial, the Mother at first claimed that she did not
know it was the Father's weekend, but recanted that when faced
with the phone tape of the Appellant's Parent's messages, wherein
she stated that the child was sick, so Cameron need not come

Cameron does not get the message from the tape however,
until after returning from Coalville, empty handed.
Appellant respectfully submits that the entire case
bears out the Mother's
son.

intent to cut the Appellant from his

She had seen her Attorney, and consistent with his

instructions she cuts off all contact by way of her letter,
and then when faced with the Petition for specific visitation,
she responded to the same, by filing her petition to terminate
parental rights.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the lower Court and remand with instructions to set out a
meaningful visitation schedule for the Father with his Child.
As to the Fourth instruction, regarding the FINDINGS,
Fazzio's payment of child support, the lower Court made the
following three FINDINGS:
7(d) After the parties separated for the last time,
Petitioner spoke to Respondent many times about needing
money and child support, and he refused to give her any
child support.
7(f) Petitioner received no child support from Respondent
and she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable.
Even though Respondent'* s parents, Richard and Stephanie
Fazzio, lived at the same address during this entire
period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked
for her child support and he refused to give it to her.
8(a) The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent
owed to Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support
at the time of trial in this matter.

In marshalling the evidence in support of 7(d), and
7(f) Appellant submits that the record is totally void of any
evidence that the Appellant refused to give her any child support.
The Mother however,

testified in several places that

Appellant had not paid any child support.

Note the transcript

at pages 107, 121 and 122.
The total basis for this FINDING, is found exclusively
in the testimony of the Mother, who testified repeatedly that
when she asked Respondent for money, he would say that he would
get her what he could, or that he himself did not have any money.
Note the transcript at page 67, wherein the Mother is on direct
examination:
Q.
A.

Okay. Did you ever ask respondent for money for
R.A.F.?
Yes, sir.

Q.

And what was his response?

A.

"I don't have it."
nonchalant.

"I'll get it to youM, just

In addition, it is important to note that during the
time in question, the Mother was on public assistance, and receiving
payments from the State. (T-122).
She testified that she did not file any Petition against
him for arrearage because he was to pay Recovery Services and
not her (T-121), and when it Game right down to it she did not
know what he paid to Recovery Services. (T-122).

It addition, the Mother testified at page 107 that she
i -i
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to

her by Cameron as and for child support, in the first place.
On the otherhand, the Appellantfs Father testified
about the Appellant's ability to generate income..(T-428)
He also testified about Cameron cashing checks at the shop so
that Cameron could give some cash to the Mother, (T-453)
In addition, he testified about providing the car
to the Mother, but she abandoned the same, and so the Fazzios
got it started, and then sold the same. After it was abandoned
all they could get for it was $75.00. (1-514 and following)
It is true that the Father did

not pay his child

support regularly on even consistently to the Mother as required
by Court order, however, there were two reasons for the same.
First, as testified to by the Father, (T-556 and following)
that any monies payable would be paid to Recovery Services and
not the Mother, and that the payment or lack of payment to them
did not increase or decrease any sums to the Mother.
Second, Appellant had four dependants, himself, his
present wife (who was expecting T-552), daughter Jennifer, and Alicia.
(T -526) . Since, being critically, injured in.his automobile accident,
Appellant was only able to make a fraction of income of even
Poverty level. Note the transcript at page 581, showing gross
income 2-16-89 of $3,243.00, and the transcript at page 526
for the year prior.
With this amount of income, the Appellant paid some
money to the Mothfer, but in addition provided various necessities
f6r the children as he could, ie: diapers, medicine, shoes, coat.
(T-52S).

Appellant submits that it is fair to say that he had
not paid all that much in the way of child support, but it is
not fair to say that he refused to pay, nor is it fair to say
that he did not pay any child support.
Futhermore, considering his financial ability to pay,
he really did pay as best he could, with four dependants, going
on five, and having a gross income of $3,243.00.
Appellant respectfully submits that it was against the
clear weight of the evidence to suggest that he did not pay
any child support and furthermore that he refused to pay.
As to the fifth instruction to the lower Court, regarding
the FINDINGS, Fazzio's provision of gifts for the child, the Court
made the following FINDING:
7(1) Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were
purchased for the child by Respondent, but in light
of the fact she testified her son did not pay child
support because he had been unemployed and his earnings
were low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court
believes it was the paternal grandparents who were
thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys in question
for R.A.F.
As noted above, this is merely an attempt to get the
Appellate Court to defer to the lower Court's determination
of credibility, since only the lower Court can test the demeanor
of the witness, ect.
However, there is no basis to suggest, even if the lower
Court questioned Appellant's Mother regarding the gifts, there
is no basis to suggest that the Appellant did not shower the
child with the various gifts, involving trucks, walkie-talkies,
etc.

As noted in the transcript beginning at page 109, the
Mother testified that she did not know if the walkie-talkies
given the child came from Cameron.

She testified that she did

not know if Cameron had purchased the child the big brown truck,
nor did she know if Cameron has purchased the big white one,
as well for the child.
Appellant submits that there in fact is no basis to
suggest from the Motherfs testimony that no gifts were in fact
given to the Child by his Father, as she recanted her testimony
about the same. (T- 109 & 112)
On the other hand, the Court had boxes of toys and
puzzles and books, and articles of clothing physically produced
in open Court and pictures, volumes of pictures, of the Child
and his Father and his family of the many memorable times with
this Child, who was not even four years old at the time of trial.
The lower Court may say that it finds certain evidence
unreliable, but no one can ignore the volumes of evidence that
the Father provided many, many gifts, etc. for the child and
on meaningful occasions.
Appellant submits, that what does speak volumes is that
it is undisputed that neither the Father nor his Family had
any Christmas with the child in 1989, as it required a Court
order for them to spend their Christmas with the child in
March of 1990.
Due to a page limitation of Appellant's Brief, with
the exception of the FINDING regarding acknowledging paternity

Appellant will briefly respond to the balance of the instructions
given by this Court to the lower Court regarding the FINDINGS.
As to the sixth instruction to the lower Court, th€i
number of times Fazzio visited the child during particular
periods, the lowerG6urt made FINDINGS 7(h), 7(i) and 7(j).
None of these address particular times that Fazzio visited
the child during certain periods they only suggest that the
child did say he had not seen his Father, when he was "always"
asked after visitation, and that the testimony of the Father
and his folks was unreliable.
As to the seventh instruction to the lower Court, the
length of each of the visits, the lower Court completely ignored
and did not address at all.
As to the eighth instruction to the lower Court,
the number of visits Woodward intentionally prevented, the lower
Court completely ignored and did not address at all.
As to the ninth instruction to the lower Court, the sums
Fazzio provided as child support, either personally or through
his parents, the lower Court made FINDINGS 7(k) and 8(c).
FINDING 7(k) states that while payments were made by
Appellant!s parents for child support, only three had been
reinbursed by the Father, and FINDING 8(c) states that the
Mother never received any money from Respondent or any one,
on an account with Respondents name on it.

(This Court needs

to look at the specific findings, as Counsel has had to severely
simplify the same for purposes herein.)

There is no question that the FINDINGS, provide no
underlying facts as to the child support provided either by
the Appellant nor by his parents.
As to the tenth instruction to the lower Court, the
number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the Child,

the lower

Court made no findings whatsoever and did not address at all.
However, the record is replete with the number and type
of gifts Fazzio gave the Child.

Note the transcript at page

355 and following, page 407 and following and 519 and following.
As to the eleventh instruction to the lower Court,
the occasions on which Fazzio gave gifts, the lower Court made
no findings whatsoever and did not address it at all.
As to the twelveth instruction to the lower Court, the
statements, acts, ommissions reflecting Fazzio's intent to accept
or disregard his obligation as a parent, the lower Court
made FINDINGS 7(b) and 7(c) regarding what the Court found to
be the case while the parties were married.
There are no findings regarding this instruction,
involving the time after the parties had their marriage annulled
to the time of the Mother's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.
As to the thirteenth instruction to the lower Court,
the impact of Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazziofs
ability to maintain contact with the child, the lower Court
made FINDING 7(t), wherein the lower Court stated:
7(c) The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's
movements from different residences being the cause
of Respondentsfs failure to visit with the child,
Respondent failed to have contact with the child to

avoid paying child suport . . . . ( T h e Court then
goes on about a single incident where the Father
saw the Motherfs sister, and asked her not to tell
the Mother.)
Appellant submits that this conclusion is without merit,
as the child support was to go to Recovery Services, and not
to the mother, according to everyone's testimony, and the money
going to the Mother from the State, would not be affected in
the slightest by whether the Father was paying any money to
them or not.
There is no basis for the lower Court to fail to
address

the impact of Woodward's frequent relocations on

Fazzio's ability to maintain contact with the child.
As to the fourteenth instruction to the lower Court, the
effect Fazzio's living and working outside Utah had on his
visitation,

the lower Court made no findings whatsoever and

did not address at all.
Appellant will come back to the fifteenth instruction
regarding acknowledging paternity.
As to the sixteenth and last instruction to the lower
Court, regarding any other factors bearing on whether Fazzio
consciously disregarded the child to such an extent that the
parent-child relationship was destroyed, the lower Court made
no findings whatsoever and did not address at all.
However, this is a crucial area for the lower Court
to address as noted in the prior appeal, in the Opinion at page
477, wherein this Court stated that not only must the finding
T-pfl^rt that there has been a conscious disregard of che Father's

parental obligations, but second, thedisregard led to the
destruction of the parent child relationship.
As to the fifteenth instruction to the lower Court,
the manner and effect of any refusal on Fazziofs part to legally
acknowledge his paternity, the lower Court made FINDINGS #10(a)
arid #10(b).
10(a) Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior
marriage, and the father of Petitioner's child Darren
Christopher Holt, received notice in approximately
December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery
Services stating he was responsible for child support
for R.A.F. Mr. Holt testified that he approached
Respondent numerous times regarding this situation and
asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F.. Respondent
steadfastly refused to ever sign a document with the
Department of Recovery Services acknowledging his
paternity with R.A.F. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit
to his paternity of R.A.F. with the State and
Respondent consistently refused;
10(b) Although Respondent claimed he had signed
a document upon the birth of R.A.F. acknowledging
paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a copy
of any documents, or even an identification of a
document he had signed acknowledging paternity when
challenged to do so at trial by Petitioner's Counsel
The result of Respondent's failure to acknowledge
the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was
that Darren Holt paid child support to the State
of Utah's Department of Recovery Services on behalf
of R.A.F., an obligation that was rightfully
that of the Respondent.
Appellant submits that even assuming this Findings to
be accurate, there is no Finding whatsoever of a manner and effect,
of any refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his
paternity.

In otherwords, what if anything, do either of these
findings have to do with destroying a parent-child relationship?
There was no effect whatsoever on the relationship
of the Father with his Child, and could not be, because the
child was too young to understanding any of this.
That is the case, unless the Mother drills the child
of four, at most, on this allegation, but even then it is not
the Father destroying the parent-child relationship, it would
have been the Mother.
As to actually what Mr. Holt testified to was that
the Father stated that he had already signed the apprcpr iate
papers and that it was therefore not necessary for the Father
to do anything more with Recovery Services or anyone else.
At page 160 of the Transcript, Mr. Holt testified on
Cross-examination, as follows:
Q.

You ccine out and talk to Cameron on these different
ten occasions, Cameron would tell you it's no longer
necessary to go to Recovery Services and sign the
papers there; is that correct?

A.

To my recollection, he never came out and said that,
no. Basically, what he said is that there -- it
wasn't necessary for him to do any -- well, I guess
you're right, what you said was correct. It was
not necessary for him to go down and sign any other
papers, but I was still held accountable for his
son, even though he had signd -- his name was on
the birth certificate.

As to any question that the State may have to as to
who the Father of the child was, the Mother herself testified that
she was not sure whether it was her ex-husband Darren Holt or
the Father that needed to take the blood tests. (T-101 )
Surely this Court is well aware of the fact that the

H.L.A. blood testing is a method of exclusion of paternity,
and therefore there would only be need of Darren Holt to submit
to the test, not the Father, herein.
The father on the otherhand, testified at page 593:
Q.

Have you ever formally gone to the State of Utah
or any agency thereof and taken responsibility for
your son, to your knowledge? Yes or no.

A.

Yes.

Q.

When?

A.

September 17, 1986, L.D.S. Hospital, it was notarized
right there right then that night, to my knowledge
I had -- that was what I had to do.

Perhaps the most significant problem that the Appellant
has with the FINDING,

is where did this child get his name

R.A.F., if the Father of the child was ever in question. As
noted on pages 222 and 491, the name has not only the Father in
the same, but has a heritage of the Father's family in the same.
Appellant submits that surely one can not say that
because he did not have an ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY, in
his pocket when he is on the stand, that that is proof that
therefore the "Respondent was unable to provide a copy of any
document, or even an identification of a document he had signed
acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by
Petitioner's Counsel!1
In reality, everyone testified that the Office of
Recovery Services was working with Appellant regarding tihild
support.

This is significant as the Appellant never signed

anything at the request of Mr. Holt, nor did he ever take any

of Recovery Services, chat did not have the correct information
and the Mother would have been the sole source for the same.
Hence, all that Mr. Holt had to testify to merely
goes to show that the Appellee was misleading the Office of
Recovery Services, rather than, showing any denial of paternity
by the Appellant.
This is particularly so, since it is the Appellee
requesting assistance and she is the only one in contact with
Recovery Services.

ARGUMENT NO.
THERE IS NO BASIS IN ANY OF THE FINDINGS TO SUGGEST
THAT THE-FATHER DESTROYED THE PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP.
In this case, this Court has held in the prior Appeal,
at page 477, as follows:
The Wulffenstein test for determining abandonment in
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements.
First, the party seeking termination must prove that
"the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard
for his or her parental obligations11 to the child.
Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the party must
demonstrate that the disregard led to the destruction
of the parent-child relationship.'1 (4) Id: Wulffenstein,
560 P.2d at 334. Both of these elements must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Santokly vs.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403,
71 L.Ed 2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P.2d
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983).
Then in Footnote #4, at the bottom of page 477 of the
prior Appeal, this Court stated:
#4. Concern for the child's best interest is manifested
in the second prong of the Wulffenstein abandonment test,

there is a strong presumption that a child is better
off in the care of his natural parents, or at least
having some relationship with its natural parents, and
absent clear and convincing evidence that the parentfs
disregard for his or her obligations caused a destruction
of the parenti-child relationship, the presumption against
termination will govern. See In re J.P. 648 P.2d 1365,
1377 (Ufcah 1982); In re Gastello, 632 P. 2d 855, 856-57
(Utah 1981); State ex rel. M.W.H. vs Aguilar, 794 P. 2d
27, 29 (Utah App 1990). (Emphasis original)
As a result, Appellant submits that there clearly is a
presumption that the child is better off, not being terminated
from his Father1, and that to beat the presumption, the Mother
would have had to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the Father's conduct led to the destruction of the parent
child relationship.
At the outset of this argument, it is critical for the
Court of Appeals to know, once again, that the Mather has no
knowledge of the facts surrounding the Fatherfs contact and
the Father's conduct, once

the child is picked up by the

Child's Paternal Grandparents for visitation.

Note the

transcript at pages 105 and 106.
As noted in the transcript at page 536 and following the
critical downfall . of the

failing relationship between

the parties, occured when the Appellant came home during lunch
unexpectedly, and found his wife Kim Fazzio, in the shower x*ith
a Mr. Mark Woodward.
After the Fazziofs marriage was annulled, Kim Fazzio,
married the same Mark Woodward, and the r&ncor between the
parents of R.A.F. was almost beyond control.
Wisely the Paternal Grandparents stepped in between the

hostile factions, and picked up and delivered the child from
the time that Cameron stppped to the time that the Mother
terminated all visitation, pursuant to Exhibit #4. (T-78).
As the Court can see from the undisputed event,
surrounding the March, 1990, Christmas; celebration, and the
memorable gifts privided the child by his

Father, Cameron,

which the Mother and Mark Woodward, forceably prevented the child
from receiving , as noted on page 292 of the transcript, there
was an overt effort to destroy the parent-child relationship
of the Father and his Child, by the Mother and

her family.

The various statements by the Mother on Direct Examination,
that the Father had not given the child any gifts whatsoever
and never remembered the child on special .days like birthdays
and Christmas, etc., which she fully recanted on Cross-examination
when faced with the many toys, puzzles, articles of clothing
and the blow ups of various pictures reflecting special times
of a Father with his son, speak volumes of how this Mother would
go to whatever means available to terminate the

Father's rights

involving this Child.
After all, the Mother firmly maintained her position in
Court about the relationship, until she was faced with the actual
physical evidence produced in open court, the existence of which
she could not deny.
On page 67 of the transcript on direct examination,
she stated, without any hesitation whatsoever:

Did he ever buy any c l o t h e s f o r R.A.F.?
No, siir.
Any toys or anything?
No, sir.
On the boy's birthday and Christmas, did he give
the boy any presents?
No, sir.
However, when sitting on the witness stand, and looking
right at the gifts, and right at the pictures, etc., she then
changes her story to say that she has no personal knowledge of
the clothes that the Father provided his son, and the toys
that the Father provided his son nor the times and special
events that were remembered by the Father with very meaningful
gifts to his son.

Note the transcript at page 109 and following.

Appellant submits that the level of hostility is merely
hinted at by these references to Christmas in March, refusing
to allow the child to keep his gifts from his Father and his
Father's family, and all of the visitation with the minor
child that was denied by the Mother, which required that the
Appellant literally obtain a Court order to be with his son,
Appellant submits that there can be no question as
to what the Mother attempted to do in reference to a destruction
of the parent-child relationship, between the Father and his son.

However, the question that this Court must address is
what if anything, did the Father do in reference to an alleged
destruction of the parent-child relationship between this Father
and his son.
As noted above in the prior Appeal at page 477, there
must be established by clear and confincing evidence that the
alleged disregard of the Father led to the destruction of the
parent-child relationship.
The Child was born on September 17, 1986, some three
months before the parents even married, (T-19) and before the
child could even focus on life, the Father was out of the home.(T-30).
Contact and visitation between the Father and his son
was ffas the parties can agree."
According to the Mother, she sought out an attorney,
on how she could totally cut off the Father's rights involving
the child, and then systematically followed the attorney's
instructions, by cutting off completely the Child's contact with
the Father and the Father's family.
Everyone agreed, it took a Court order to force the
Mother to allow the Father and his family to be with the child,
and that based upon that Court order, the Father at least in
1990, is spending Christmas with his child in March.

Still where is the evidence, and where is the FINDING
OF FACT, that shows sufficient underlying detail, where the
Father's conduct led to a destruction of the parent-child
relationship.
In 1989, when the Petition filed by the Appellant to
spell out specific visitation the Child had just turned three
years of age.

He could, of course, walk and was potter trained,

and his vocabulary was on the increase significantly.
However, the infant could hardly percieve what was
really going on in life.
At three years of age, the child knows about candy,
and toys and surprises, etc., but what would a three year old
know about child support and acknowledgments of paternity, etc?
Futhermore, even assuming that the child is exceptionally
precocious, and would be versed in the legal aspects of the same
at three years of age, who would have told the child about the
same, as according to the Mother, the Father is having no contact
with the child, and there was no evidence that the Paternal
Grandparents were engaging in this level of dialogue with the
infant, even assuming they would belittle their own son in front
of their grandson.
Where is there any basis to establish even a hint, let
alone by clear and convincing evidence, that the Father's
conduct led to a destruction of the parent-child relationship?
Even if one were to assume, as the lower Court did,
that no child support was paid, how would the child learn of

Surely the Mother was getting more through public
assistance than she would have had if the Appellant paid
his $100.00 per month on time and consistently, so the child
is not going without or having to;.mkke it in life on less money
per month, whether Appellant pays or not.
Kence, the infant was not facing an empty bowl of cereal,
wherein the Child would be exposed to going without, because
the Mlow life Father did not pay this month, so we have nothing
to eat.11
The Mother was better off on public assistance than
she was on his $100.00 per month.
Kence, the infant would have no exposure to the payment
of child support and whether Cameron paid his money or not, and
this perhaps is highlighted by the fact that even the Child's
Mother does not know if Cameron has been paying his $100.00
per month

to Recovery Services. (Note the transcript at page 122).

It is interesting to note however, that the infant would
know some things, like what was his name,,and others around
him that would have parts of the names reflected as R.A.F., as
their own names.
So there would have been some perception by this three
year old of who's who, etc.
Yet, where is the evidence, that shows the Father's
conduct leading to a destruction of the parent child relationship.
Lastly, where is the FINDING OF FACT, with sufficient
underlying detail, or any detail whatsoever, establishing that

Appellant submits that there is no evidence, in fact
there is not a hint, as to hotf this Father allegedly destroyed
his parent-child relationship with this three year old.
The evidence on the otherhand, to sustain this FINDING,
must be to the level of clear and convincing evidence, the
standard of proof just below that afforded those charged with
criminal activity, ie: beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
This case involves perhaps, the most important of all
of lifefs issues - a relationship between a Father and his
infant son.
The burden of proof ought to be beyond a reasonable doubt
as the impacts on peoples lives is more often than not, far more
grave than a fine or time in jail.
Here is a case involving a Father's contact with a
three year old child - a child that bears his own name, and the
name of a favorite uncle of the Father.
This is no "run of the mill" abandonment case, as in
this case the Mother admits that she went to an attorney to see
how she could cut off the Father from his rights involving the
infant boy.

She testified that the attorney told her that she

had to go a whole year without any contact.
As noted in the first exhibic attached hereto, she prepared
a letter and delivered it to the Fatherfs parents, doing just
exactly as instructed by her attorney - no visitation at all.
Immediately, thereafter, the Father Petitions the
Court for specific visitation, instead of the arrangement involving,

"as the parties can agree.11
The Mother responds to the request for meaningful contact,
with a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.
This is not a case of credibility, as the Mother's own
testimony supports the bottomline conclusion, that it literally
took a court order for the Father to be with his son.
She testified that they took the gifts of the Father away
from the child, and refused to let the child have the same in her
home.
She stated that she had no knowledge of the gifts, etc.,
given to the Child by his Father, and yet the lower Court has taken
this "no knowledge" and concluded by a '.'clear and convincing
standard" that the Father abandoned his son.
This Court has already held in the prior appeal, that there
must be clear and convincing evidence of how the Father's conduct
led to a destruction of the parent-child relationship.
There are no findings and frankly no evidence to support
this determination, as the child was but an infant, had just
turned three years of age the month before the Father petitioned
for specific visitation.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court carefully
review this most critical part of life itself, ie: his family,
and then reverse and remand this matter once again to the Court,
with instructions to set out meaningful visitation jyJth the Father,
Dated this /V ^3ay of March, 1993,
/

teA^LJOHR/WALSH
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing: BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, to
the Plaintiff, by mailing the same in the United States Mails,
addressed to: LARRY KELLER, ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF,
257 TOWERS, SUITE 340, 257 EAST 200 SOUTH - 10, SALT LAKE CITY,
UTAH, 84111, this

ay of March, 1993.

ADDENDUll

I've been meaning to say this for a long time but after
yesterday's experience I think it is best that I don't bring Tony
down until Mark comes back to town. I feel this way for several
reasons. The first being, the way you treat me as a person. You
act like I owe you the visits to Tony. Dick especially doesn't
miss a chance to yell and this intimidates me and brings back the
same feelings of fear that Cameron used to cause me. I don't
deserve this. I have been a good mother and you don't have any
right to treat me this way.
Secondly: the way Michelle was treated. She was an innocent
person trying to do you a favor and you treated her very
harshly. It makes me mad to hear thajb Dick said " She (meaning
ine) always does this and she should get her act together" because
I have always bent over backwards to let you see Tony. Even my
owiLjjarents did not have him over the weekend every other week
n ^ r j ^ y o u r parents get your kids every other weekT] x am not
responsible to take Chris to Darren's parents nor am I
resppnsible.J;cufcake Tony to Cameron's parents.
I have been doing this for you out of kindness because I realize
Cameron didn't bring him over.
Thirdly: I don't
what I am doing.
while back that I
you don't need to

like the way you question other people about
It is none of your business. I told you a
would let you see Tony when I was in town and
hassel my family and friends.

As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be
back but when both Mark and I are back we will bring Tony to see
you.

Kim
S)J?^~

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

djitft ©isirict HTubenile Court
Richard W. Birrell
Court Commissioner

Judge Arthur G. Chnstean
Judge Olof A. Johansson
Judge Franklyn B. Matheson
Judge Sharon P. McCully

Roy W. Whitehouse
Court Executive

January 24, 1992
John Walsh
Attorney at Law
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Re: Woodward v. Fazzio,
Case No. 900626-CA

Dear Mr. Walsh:
The Court has received a remand of the above case for more specific
factual findings as it relates to paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of this Court's
findings. I, therefore, invite you, but you are not required, to submit
proposed written findings consistent with the request of the Court of Appeals.
Such findings should be provided to this Court no later than February 28,
1992. If additional time is necessary, please advise me.

Respectfully,

Hon.^eflof

3522 South 700 West / Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 / 801-265-5900 / FAX 801-265-5936

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Petitioner
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST :
OF

:

PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
OF FACT

RICHARD ANTHONY FAZZIO,
DOB: September 17, 1986

:

Case No.

:

Judge Olof A. Johansson

786412

KIM (FAZZIO) WOODWARD,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO,
Respondent.
Comes now Petitioner, Kim (Fazzio) Woodward, and proposes the
following additional Findings of Fact to be made by the Honorable
Olof A. Johansson pursuant to the remand of the above-entitled
matter by the Utah Court of Appeals.
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I.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7.

Petitioner would begin by recommending to the Court that it
amend paragraph 7 to begin as follows:
M

7.
Although there was disputed evidence
admitted during the course of the trial, the
Court finds the following facts by clear and
convincing evidence to be believable:
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an abortion when he first
learned she was pregnant with R.A.F. Respondent urged Petitioner to get an abortion on
more than one occasion (T. 20, 21, 585, 586).
b. Respondent was never a parent to R.A.F.
from the time he was born.
He refused to
babysit the child, even though he was not
working most of the time during the parties'
marriage. Respondent played no part in the
care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the oneyear marriage. Respondent would not get up at
night with the child, would not change a diaper, and would not feed a bottle (T. 23, 24,
25).
c.
Respondent refused to take financial
responsibility for R.A.F. during the course of
the marriage, and never gave her any money for
the child in any way. His refusal to help
support R.A.F. resulted in the child being
required to wear second-hand items and lacking
some of the necessities of life (T. 29, 30).
d. After the parties separated for the last
time, Petitioner spoke to Respondent many
times about needing money and child support,
and he refused to give her anything whatsoever as child support (T. 30).
e. Respondent never purchased presents or
items for the child during the course of the
marriage, and Petitioner testified she never
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observed him purchase anything for the child
after the marriage (T. 30).
f•
Respondent did not •love or nurture
R.A.F. during the time of the marriage in any
way (T. 30).
g.
On one occasion, Respondent grabbed
Petitioner by the hair and had her on the
floor and was beating her head into the floor
when she started calling for Christopher (her
son from a prior marriage) to run over to the
neighbors and have them call the police. As
soon as he moved, Respondent said f(I)f anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her.1
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on
the couch observing this physical abuse to his
mother and the threat to kill her.
Both
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they
were taken by the police to the YWCA after
this incident (T. 42, 43, 44).
h. Petitioner received absolutely no child
support from Respondent and she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable to.
Even though Respondent's parents, Richard and
Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address
during this entire period of time, they would
refuse to tell her Respondent's address so
that she might collect child support from him.
Every time Petitioner saw Respondent, she
asked him for child support and he would
always refuse to give it to her (T. 71, 72,
73, 74).
i. Although Respondent came around four or
five times from the date of their last separation in September of 1987 through September of
1988, he spent very little time with R.A.F.
After September of 1988, Respondent never came
to see the child at all, nor telephoned, nor
contacted the child in any way (T. 75, 76, 77,
78).
j. Petitioner would allow Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see the
3

child occasionally between September of 1988
and October of 1989 as they requested. However , after the visitations with Respondent's
parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F. if
he had seen Respondent during the visitations,
and R.A.F. would say fnof (T. 82, 83).
k. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio,
the paternal grandparents, testified that they
visited with the child on occasion between
September of 1988 and October 1989; and although the paternal grandparents claimed that
Respondent was present during some of these
grandparent visitation periods, the father's
testimony in this regard was directly impeached and the Court finds his testimony
unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable.
1. The grandparents' testimony in regard to
their son's visitations seemed unreliable and
unbelievable in light of their own great
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F.,
and in light of the fact that their testimony
was impeached on several occasions.
For
instance, the grandparents' willingness to
exaggerate and stretch the truth regarding
their son's contact with the child was shown
by their testimony regarding the court-ordered
visitation occurring between March and the
time of the trial in the instant case in
August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner
was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that
Petitioner brought the child to her and her
husband for visitation for approximately one
year (T. 340, 348, 349, 351). Furthermore,
Mrs. Fazzio admitted on cross-examination that
she really did not know when Respondent did or
did not see R.A.F. (T. 352). Mrs. Fazzio
admitted that she and her husband were paying
the attorney's fees for the instant action and
not Respondent (T. 350).
m. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she
and her husband had submitted child support
payments to Petitioner once this termination
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf
4

of Respondent; however, she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three of the nine
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner
(T. 322). Furthermore, Mrs* Fazzio admitted
that no offers were made to pay the child
support to Petitioner until this termination
action was filed on January 26, 1990, by
Petitioner (T. 354).
n. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys
were purchased for the child by Respondent,
but in light of the fact she testified her son
did not pay child support because he had been
unemployed and his earnings were low, her
testimony was unreliable and the Court believes it was the paternal grandparents who
were thoughtful enough to purchase the few
toys in question for R.A.F. (T. 318).
o. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with whether or not Petitioner
had enough money to meet the basic needs of
R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs.
Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it
was fa matter between Kim and Cameron. . .
(A)nd I did not know he was not providing for
her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.1
(T. 321). Despite this testimony, on at least
two different occasions during Petitioner's
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs.
Fazzio admitted that she knew Respondent was
not paying child support to Petitioner, making
her testimony less credible (T. 318).
p.
Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability of the testimony
of the paternal grandparents came during
cross-examination
involving
court-ordered
visitation commenced in June of 1990 after the
instant actions were filed.
Mrs. Fazzio
admitted that she was aware that visitation
with R.A.F. was to be at the residence of she
and her husband by court order (T. 373). Upon
cross-examination, she admitted that on one
occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake
City with a boat attached to their truck, but
5

dropped off the boat prior to picking up
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admitted that after picking up R.A.F., she and her
husband went back and picked up the boat and
went boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F.,
completely unbeknownst to Petitioner (T. 399,
400).
Mrs. Fazzio then stated, apparently
seriously, that her boat was her home and so
she didn't feel that she and her husband were
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge
Wilkinson's) Order that visitation be at their
residence (T. 400). She indicated that '. . .
summer weekends, our boat is our home. . .
It's an overnight boat, it has cooking and
sleeping facilities, and we live in it weekends. ' (T. 400). However, when Mrs. Fazzio
was asked how many weekends they had slept
overnight on the boat that year, 1990, through
August 17 (the day of the trial), she admitted
that they had not slept on the boat once that
year (T. 400).
q.
Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal
grandfather, agreed with his wife that his
boat was his personal residence and their
exercising visitation in June of 1990 by
taking the child boating rather than to their
home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of
the District Court's Order (T. 468). Such
testimony shows the incredulity and unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany
Fazzio and Richard Bruce Fazzio.
r. Respondent never provided R.A.F. with a
gift on his birthday or for Christmas (T. 79,
80).
s. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a
note in October of 1989 indicating that she
was going on vacation and she would allow them
to see the child later. It was immediately
after receiving this note at a time of expected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio
retained an attorney and filed the Petition
for Modification on behalf of their son, the
Respondent (T. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81). The

6

Court believes that the fact is the instant
action was filed only as a response to Respondent fs parents' concern about their own visitation with the child, and not their son's.
t. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's
present husband, Mark Woodward (T. 83). This
could only be true if he simply did not know
who his biological father was as a result of
his biological father's failure to make any
serious efforts to visit with him.
u. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested between March of 1990 and
the time of trial in this matter (August
1990); although there were only three occasions when Respondent took advantage of the
opportunity to visit the child during this
period of time. After one of these visitations, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom,
Cameron told me he's my dad.
He's not my
dad. '
On another occasion after a courtordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Petitioner who Cameron (Respondent) was, and he
would say that he was Brian's brother; and
when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he
would always say 'Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather)
(T. 88).
v.
Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken
Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.fs stepfather,
Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never
mentioned Respondent or anything about his
natural father, and that contrary to the
claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been
taught anything by the family with regard to
who his father is, that it is just a natural
relationship and a happy family (T. 138).
w. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from different residences
being the cause of Respondent's failure to
visit with the child, Respondent failed to
have contact with the child to avoid paying
child support.
On one occasion, Christy
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she
7

accidentally ran into Respondent at a truck
stop in February of 1989 at a time when she
was aware Petitioner was looking for him to
get him to pay child support.* Respondent said
to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation ' . . .
do me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me,
because I am supposed to be in Nevada. ' (T.
182, 183).
x. Even though Respondent was provided with
court-ordered visitation after the filing of
the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort
to spend much time with the child during the
court-ordered visitations. Ken Kresser, the
husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of
Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, testified that after the May 1990 courtordered visitation with Respondent, he asked
R.A.F. about the visitation. R.A.F. replied
that he had gone to the park.
When Mr.
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent) was
there with him, R.A.F. stated 'no, he was
sleeping.' (T. 173).
II.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 8

a.
The testimony was clear at the trial
that Respondent had never personally paid a
single penny of child support to Petitioner,
and that some $3,000.00 in back child support
was owed at the time of trial in this matter
(T. 71, 72; T. 362, 363).
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to
contact Respondent to get him to pay child
support and was regularly informed by Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio,
that they did not know how to contact Respondent and could not give her an address or
telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This
Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs.
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to
allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes
of obtaining her court-ordered child support.
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c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights did she
receive any checks from anyone regarding child
support. She did receive certain checks from
the grandparents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio,
at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respondent, but her attorney advised her to return
those checks (T. 133). The evidence is uncontroverted that no monies were ever submitted
to Petitioner on a checking account with
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any
evidence that Respondent had provided any
money to Petitioner of any kind.
d. After numerous incidents of abuse, Petitioner retained a lawyer and asked Respondent
to accompany her to the lawyer's office to
sign some papers, one provision of which would
require him to pay child support. Due to the
existence of this provision, Respondent became
angry and tore up the paper, although he later
signed it (T. 63, 64, 65).
e. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts
to pay child support was inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples
from the record as to Respondent's unbelievability are follows:
1.
Respondent claimed to have
provided a car worth $600.00 to
Petitioner in lieu of two months
child support (T. 564, 565). However, rebuttal witness Scott Ortar
testified that in fact Respondent
sold the car in question to Sommers
Auto Wrecking approximately three
months after the parties' marriage
was annulled for $75.00 (T. 475482). Respondent admitted on crossexamination that he indeed sold the
very same vehicle he claimed to have
given Petitioner in lieu of child
support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for
$75.00; and further admitted that he
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did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner (T. 571, 572, 573, 574).
2. Related to, but in addition to
the foregoing regarding the car,
Respondent testified on direct examination he did not give Petitioner
title to the 1979 Mercury he was
providing her in lieu of child support after the annulment, because he
did not have the title.
Despite
this clear testimony by Respondent,
Petitioner
introduced
at
trial
Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certificate of Title to the 1979 Mercury in
question and related documents.
This exhibit clearly showed that the
Utah Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of Respondent, and was
never in the name of Petitioner.
Furthermore, this exhibit showed
that Respondent signed the document
as "transferor" before a notary
public on February 5, 1988. This
was the very date of the check introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6
made out to Respondent from Sommers
Auto Wrecking.
Moreover, the VIN
number of the vehicle on the Certificate of Title and the check made
out to Richard D. Fazzio from
Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly
the same, and clearly establish that
this was the same vehicle Respondent
claimed to have given Petitioner in
lieu of child support. When confronted with the title to the car
and the check from Sommers Wrecking
on cross-examination by Petitioner's
attorney, Respondent testified he
wished to changed his testimony
about not having the title to the
vehicle and giving it to Petitioner
in lieu of child support (T. 564,
571).
10

3.
Pursuant to the Decree of
Annulment issued by the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No.
D-87-3798 on November- 19, 1987,
Petitioner alone was entitled to
claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her
income tax return (Decree of Annulment paragraph 2).
4. Although Respondent had stated
on cross-examination that he had
always been truthful with government
agencies, Petitioner's attorney on
cross-examination showed Respondent
Exhibit 8 which is Respondent's 1987
Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney
asked Respondent if everything reported on his 1987 Tax Return was
true, and Respondent replied it was.
Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a deduction
in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his failure to pay a
single cent in child support (T.
580).
5. On cross-examination, Respondent was shown Petitioner's Exhibit
9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income
Tax Return. Respondent admitted he
paid no child support for 1988, but
that the tax return showed that he
was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had
lived in Respondent's home six
months during 1988.
Respondent
admitted that that was not true and
that he had apparently made a mistake in believing that his son,
R.A.F., had lived in his home for
six months in 1988 when he was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his
grandmother in Salt Lake City (T.
581, 582).
6. The false statements made to
the federal government on the income
11

tax return claiming R.A.F. as a
dependent under circumstances where
he did not pay a single penny of
child support made Respondent's
testimony incredible and unbelievable.
III.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 10

a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from
a prior marriage, and the father of Petitioner's child Darren Christopher Holt, received
notice in approximately December of 1986 from
the Department of Recovery Services stating he
was responsible for child support for R.A.F.
Mr. Holt testified that he approached Respondent numerous times regarding this situation
and asked him to submit to tests or sign a
legal document admitting to the paternity of
R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to ever
sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services acknowledging his paternity of
R.A.F. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent some 14
or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to
his paternity of R.A.F. with the State and
Respondent consistently refused (T. 146, 147,
148, 149, 150, 151, 591, 592).
b.
Although Respondent claimed he had
signed a document upon the birth of R.A.F.
acknowledging paternity, Respondent was unable
to provide a copy of any document, or even an
identification of a document he had signed
acknowledging paternity when challenged to do
so at trial by Petitioner's counsel (T. 590,
591). The result of Respondent's failure to
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the
State of Utah was that Darren Holt paid payments to the State of Utah's Department of
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an
obligation that was rightfully that of Respondent.
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IV.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO FINDING OF FACT NO. 11

a.
Petitioner had a child from a previous
marriage, Darren Christopher Holt (DOB: 2/13/83),
who lived with Petitioner at the time she was
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years old during that period (T. 28).
b. During the course of the marriage, she
and her children, including R.A.F., were
regularly subjected to mental and physical
threats and abuse by Respondent (T. 22, 23,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 151, 153,
154, 155, 158, 183, 184, 189, 190, 191).
c. Respondent admitted during the course of
the marriage that he "smacked Kim" and that he
did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the
child Christopher were out of the room when he
slapped her (T. 598).
d. Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage counseling during the marriage;
but not only did his abuse of her not change,
Respondent actually beat her the day of counseling because he didn't like the things she
said to the counselor (T. 21, 22, 23).
e.
Darren Holt testified that his son,
Christopher, told him during his visitations
that he was terrified of Respondent, and that
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher)
with a knife and hit him a number of times.
Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and
Christopher out of Petitioner's home with a
gun and told them that if they came back, he
(Respondent) would kill them. (T. 151, 152,
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158). This testimony
was corroborated by Petitioner.
f.
When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent
about this abuse of his son, Christopher,
Respondent replied " . . . while Christopher is
in my house, I will treat him the way I want."
13

(T. 154, 155). This testimony was corroborated by Petitioner who described Respondent's
attitude toward Christopher as "mean and
hateful . . . cruel. . ." (T. 32).
g. Respondent admitted he tried to commit
suicide on at least one occasion during the
marriage (T. 595, 596).
h.
On one occasion, Respondent grabbed
Petitioner by the hair and had her on the
floor and was beating her head into the floor
when she started calling for Christopher to
run over to the neighbors and have them call
the police. Petitioner testified that as soon
as Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f
anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her."
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on
the couch observing this physical abuse to his
mother and the threat to kill her.
Both
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they
were taken by the police to the YWCA after
this incident (T. 42, 43, 44).
CONCLUSION
While two of the three Judges on the Court of Appeals hearing
the instant matter on appeal, seemed concerned about this Court's
final decision,

it is Petitioner's belief that if the Court

provides the Findings of Fact, clearly supported by the record,
which have been proposed in the instant document, the Court of
Appeals will have a better understanding as to the nature of this
case and the reasons for this Court's decision.
As Petitioner argued in her brief on appeal:
"Never has a case more clearly demonstrated
why it is essential for an appellate court to
defer to the juvenile court on findings of
fact than the instant case. It is the posi14

tion of Appellee (Petitioner) that Appellant
(Respondent) stated numerous falsehoods and
committed perjury during his testimony in the
trial court. This was demonstrated through
cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and
evidence which could not be overcome by Appellant (Respondent). Furthermore, Appellee
(Petitioner) maintains that the physical
manner in which the Appellant (Respondent) and
his witnesses testified in this case was as
important as the words they used in determining their credibility. The trial judge alone
was in a position to judge the credibility of
the witnesses and his determination should not
be disturbed by this Court without a demonstration by Appellant (Respondent) that the
Findings are against the weight of the evidence and thus clearly erroneous. State in
Interest of P.H. and M.H. v. Harrison, 783
P.2d 565, 570 (Utah App. 1989)."
Petitioner/Appellee1s Brief at 21.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of February, 1992.

Attorney/ for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing,

first class postage prepaid, on this 28th day of

February, 1992, to:
John Walsh
2319 Foothill Drive, #270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

libJt /U&IWLS
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EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

Cftrtr Bistrict Jufeenfie Court
Judge Arthur G. Christean
Judge Olof A. Johansson
Judge Franklyn B. Matheson
Judge Sharon P. McCully

April 30,

Richard W. Birrell
Court Commissioner

1992

RoyW.Whitehouse
Court Executive

Mr. John Walsh
2319 South Foothill Drive, Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah K43 09
RE:

Woodward v. Fazzio
Case No. 900626-CA
Juvenile Court Case No.

786512

Do not give up hope. I am making serious attempts at providing more
detailed findings in the above case, in between my regular caseload.
Each of your briefs are extremely well done and very helpful.
you for them.
Respectfully,

cc:

file

3522 South 700 West / Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 / 801-265-5900

I thank
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..* THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE CL .£
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest
of

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT *>crr~
JUVENILE COURT
ju-'w
-"t
Case No,: 786412

FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY
(09/17/86)

WOODWARD, KIM (FAZZIO)

JUN 1 5 1992

ORDER

- Petitioner

vs.
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON - Respondent

:
i
:

DISTRICT COURT
Case No: 87-37986

Upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals this Court submits the
following supplemental and amended detailed findings in support of its order
entered on November 28, 1990.
Paragraph 7. Although there was disputed evidence admitted during the
course of the trial, the Court finds the following facts by clear and
convincing evidence to be believable:
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an abortion
when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F.. Respondent urged
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one occasion;
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F.
from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the child, even though
he was not working most of the time during the parties' marriage.
Respondent would not get up at night with the child, would not change a
diaper, and would not bottle feed the child;
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F.,
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money for the
child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m);
d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke to
Respondent many times about needing money and child support, and he
refused to give her any child support;
e. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she
started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior marriage) to run
over to the neighbors and have them call the police. As soon as he
moved, Respondent said'(I)£ anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill
her.' R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they were taken to the police
to the YWCA after this incident;

AMENDED FINDINGS OF
JT
State in the Interest of
FAZZIO, Richard Anthony
Page Two

f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she tried
constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though Respondent's
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during
this entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked him for child
support and he refused to give it to her;
g. Although Respondent came around four or five times from the date of
their separation in September of 1987, through September of 1988, he
spent very little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988,
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone, nor contacted the
child;
h. Petitioner would allow respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany
Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between September of 1988 and
October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F., if he
had seen Respondent during the visitations, and R.A.F., would say "no";
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents,
testified that they visited with the child on occasion between
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some of these
grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in this regard
was directly impeached and the Court finds his testimony unreliable,
untrustworthy and unbelievable;
j. The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great interest
in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact that their
testimony was impeached on several occasions. For instance, the
grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth regarding their son's
contact with the child was shown by their testimony regarding the
court-ordered visitation occurring between March and the time of the
trial in the instant case in August 1990. While suggesting that
Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner
brought the child to her and her husband for visitation for
approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on
cross-examination that she really did not know when Respondent did or
did not see R.A.F.. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and her husband were
paying the attorney's fees for the instant action and not Respondent;
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termination
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent; however,
she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three of the nine
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner. Furthermore, Mrs.
Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to pay the child support to
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Petitioner until this termination action was filed on January 26, 1990,
by Petitioner;
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the child
by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son did not
pay child support because he had been unemployed and his earnings were
low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court believes it was the
paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few
toys in question for R.A.F.;
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with whether
or not Petitioner had enough money to meet the basic needs of R.A.F.,
her grandson. Mrs. Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was
'a matter between Kim and Cameron....(A)nd I did not know he was not
providing for her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.' Despite this
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she knew
Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner, making her
testimony less credible;
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability of
the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during
cross-examination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her
residence by court order. Upon cross-examination, she admitted that on
one occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake City with a boat
attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat prior to picking up
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admitted that after picking up
R.A.F., she and her husband went back and picked up the boat and went
boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F., Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat
was her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order that
visitation be at their residence. She indicated that '• • • summer
weekends, our boat is our home. • • It's an overnight boat, it has
cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it weekends.' However,
when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how many weekends they had slept overnight
on the boat that year, 1990, through August 17 (the day of the trial),
she admitted that they had not slept on the boat once that year);
o.
Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with his
wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercising
visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather than to
their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the District
Court's Order. Such testimony shows the incredulity and
unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany Fazzio and
Richard Bruce Fazzio;
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p. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a note in October of 1989,
indicating that she was going on vacation and she would allow them to
see the child later. It was immediately after receiving this note at a
time of expected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio retained an
attorney and filed the Petition for Modification on behalf of their
son, the Respondent. The Court believes that the instant action was
filed only as a response to Responsent's parents' concern about their
own visitation with the child, and not their son's;
q. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who his biological father was
as a result of his biological father's failure to make any serious
efforts to visit with him;
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested between
March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter (August 1990),
although there were only three occasions when Respondent took advantage
of the opportunity to visit the child during this period of time.
After one of these visitations, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom,
Cameron told me he's my dad. He's not my dad.' On another occasion
after a court-ordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Petitioner who
Cameron (Respondent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother;
and when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say
•Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather);
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.'s
stepfather, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never mentioned
Respondent or anything about his natural father, and that contrary to
the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been taught anything by
the family with regard to who his father is, that it is just a natural
relationship and a happy family;
t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to visit
with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the child to
avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy Tinnin,
Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into Respondent at
a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when she was aware
Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child support.
Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation '. . . do me a
favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am supposed to be in
Nevada.•;
u. Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered visitation
after the filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort to
spend much time with the child during the court-ordered visitations.
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of Mark
Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, testified that after the May
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1990, court-ordered visitation with Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about
the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone to the park. When Mr.
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent) was there with him, R.A.F.
stated 'no, he was sleeping.';
Paragraph 8. During the period of the parties1 separation, and since
the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid
no child support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child,
Richard Anthony Fazzio.
a. The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent owed to
Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support at the time of trial in
this matter;
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respondent's
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not know how to
contact Respondent and could not give her an address or telephone
number for him. This Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs.
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to allow Petitioner to
contact him for purposes of obtaining her court-ordered child support;
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding child
support. She did receive certain checks from the grandparents, Richard
and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respondent,
but her attorney advised her to return those checks. The evidence is
^incontroverted that no monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a
checking account with Respondent's on a checking account with
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that Respondent
had provided any money to Petitioner;
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support was
inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples from
the record are follows:
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car worth $600.00 to
Petitioner in lieu of two months child support. However,
rebuttal witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking approximately
three months after the parties' marriage was annulled for
$75.00. Respondent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given Petitioner in
lieu of child support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for $75.00, and
further admitted that he did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner;
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing regarding the
car, Respondent testified on direct examination he did not give
Petitioner title to the 1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu

FAZZIO, Richard Anthony
Page Six

of child support after the annulment, because he did not have the
title. Despite this testimony by Respondent, Petitioner
introduced at trial Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certificate of
Title to the 1979 Mercury in question and related documents.
This exhibit showed that the Utah Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of Respondent, and was never in the name of
Petitioner. Furthermore, this exhibit showed that Respondent
signed the document as "transferor" before a notary public on
February 5, 1988. This was the very date of the check introduced
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to Respondent from Sommers Auto
Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN number of the vehicle on the
Certificate of Title and the check made out to Richard D. Fazzio
from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly the same, and clearly
establish that this was the same vehicle Respondent claimed to
have given Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted
with the title to the car and the check from Sommers wrecking on
cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney, Respondent testified
he wished to change his testimony about not having the title to
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child support;
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987,
Petitioner alone was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on
her income tax return;
4. Although Respondent had stated on cross-examination that he
had always been truthful with government agencies, Petitioner's
attorney on cross-examination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which
is Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney asked
Respondent if everything reported on his 1987 Tax return was
true, and Respondent replied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a
deduction in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his
failure to pay child support;
5. On cross-examination, Respondent was shown Petitioner's
Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income Tax Return.
Respondent admitted he paid no child support for 1988, but that
the tax return showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respondent's home six
months during 1988. Respondent admitted that that was not true
and that he had apparently made a mistake in believing that his
son, R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988 when he
was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his grandmother in Salt
Lake City;
6. The false statements made to the federal government on the
income tax return claiming R.A.F. as a dependent under
circumstances where he did not pay child support made
Respondent's testimony incredible and unbelievable.
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Paragraph 10. Subsequent to the birth of said child.
Respondent had
the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons or
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent.
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior marriage, and the
father of Petitioner's child Darren Christopher Holt, received notice
in approximately December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery
Services stating he was responsible for child support for R.A.F.. Mr.
Holt
testified that he approched Respondent numerous times regarding this
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to
ever sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F.. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to his paternity of
R.A.F. with the State and Respondent consistently refused;
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a document upon the birth
of R.A*F* acknowledging paternity. Respondent was unable to provide a
copy of any document, or even an identification of a document he had
signed acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by
Petitioner's counsel. The result of Respondent's failure to
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was that
Darren Holt paid child support to the State of Utah's Department of
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation that was
rightfully that of the Respondent.
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this
case, there is evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and
Respondent lived together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was
emotionally abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the
subject of this action.
a. Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage, Darren Christopher
Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), who lived with Petitioner at the time she was
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years old
during that period;
b. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and her children,
including R.A.F., were regularly subjected to mental and physical
threats and abuse by Respondent;
c. Respondent admitted during the course of the marriage that he
"smacked Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the
child Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her;
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d* Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage counseling
during the marriage; but not only did his abuse of her not change,
Respondent actually beat her the day of counseling because he didn't
like the things she said to the counselor;
e. Darren Holt testified that his son, Christopher, told him during
his visitations that he was terrified of Respondent, and that
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit him a
number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of
Petitioner's home with a gun and told them that if they came back, he
(Respondent) would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by
Petitioner;
f. When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this abuse of his son,
Christopher, Respondent replied". . . While Christopher is in my house,
I will treat him the way I want.M this testimony was corroborated by
Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward Christopher as
"mean and hateful . . . cruel. . .;
g. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she
started calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have
them call the police. Petitioner testified that as Christopher moved.
Respondent said M(I)if anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her."
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F.
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the
YWCA after this incident.
Dated this 15th day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT

tJohans sok, Judge

cc: ^rfr. Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
<Jtix. John Walsh, Esq.
3865 South Wasatch Blvd.
Suite 202 - Cove Point Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
^tJtah Court of Appeals
No. 900626CA
10:111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

DARREN S. HOLT

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY FAYE
HOLT
Plaintiff,

vs.
KIMBERLY FAYE HOLT

Civil No. D85-3447
Judge Banks

Defendants,

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kimberly Faye Holt, and being first
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That she is the defendant in the above-entitled matter,

the natural mother of the minor child of this marriage, DARREN
CHRISTOPHER HOLT, born February 13, 1984.
2.

That the parties seperated on approximately May 20,

1985 and at that time agreed to a temporary joint custody arrangement of the minor child, Darren Holt.
3.

That from May 1985 through November 1985 the parties did

share custody of the minor child, but that during

the first

part of December, 1985 plaintiff refused and has continued to
relinquish custody of the minor child to defendant.
4.
and a

That defendant is the natural mother of the minor child
fit afld proper person to whom care custody and control of

5.

That plaintiff has attempted suicide in the^Tast and

defendant fears for the minor childs well-being, and further
believes that plaintiff is not a fit parent to care for said chil
6-

That plaintiff should be ordered to pay child support in

the sum of $100.00 per month on

a temporary basis until final

determination of the court for permanent support and custody.
'1

That because of plaintiff's refusal to return the

minor child, Darren, to defendant's custody, all future visitation should be on a restricted and supervised basis.
8.

All allegations contained in plaintiff's affidavit

regarding defendant's boyfriend's alleged threats to the minor
child are false, and in complete error.

Defendant's boyfriend,

has a strong and supportive relationship with the minor child.
DATED t h i s ^ / 7 day of January, 1986.

'74<Csrri/r{/L

KIMBERLY FAYE

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^ 2

da

y

of

January,

1986.

Salt Lak
My Commission expires:

/H-SJ

c, residing in
ty, Utah
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dant claims he should have been convicted
and, thus, sentenced for arson rather than
aggravated arson, as both offenses proscribe the conduct for which he was convicted. Therefore, we find defendant's justification for our reaching his Shondel argument, raised for the first time on appeal,
without merit Defendant's Shondel claim
presents neither "plain error" nor "exceptional circumstances" and, therefore, we
refuse to consider it for the first time on
appeal. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926.
CONCLUSION
In sum, because defendant failed to marshal the evidence supporting his jury conviction for aggravated arson, we refuse to
consider his claim of insufficient evidence.
Furthermore, we decline to entertain the
merits of defendant's Shondel claim, as he
raises it for the first time on appeal. We,
therefore, affirm his conviction for aggravated arson.
BENCH, P.J., and GARFF, J., concur.

Kim <Fazzio) WOODWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard Cameron FAZZIO, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 900626-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 9, 1991.
Father's parental rights were terminated by order of the Third District Juvenile
"because of the clear error in the original sentences." State v. Babbel, 770 P.2d 987, 994
(Utah 1989). In the later Babbel case, the defendant challenged the remand sentence which was
harsher than his original sentence.
The later Babbel case distinguished the "correction of an illegal sentence [which] stands on

Court, Summit County, Olaf A. Johansson,
J., and father appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that (1) trial court's
findings of fact were inadequate, and (2)
affirmance as a matter of law was precluded, thus requiring remand, in light of disputed evidence in the record.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Infants <s=>180
"Prima facie" showing of abandonment as set forth in statute concerning
termination of parental rights may be established only for custodial parent, but
abandonment by noncustodial parent may
also be established by clear and convincing
evidence that parent's conduct evidenced a
conscious disregard for his or her parental
obligations to the child, and that the disregard led to destruction of the parentchild relationship. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48.
2. Parent and Child <s=>2(8)
There is strong presumption that child
is better off in the care of its natural
parents, or at least having some relationship with its natural parents, and absent
clear and convincing evidence that parent's
disregard for his or her obligations caused
destruction of parent-child relationship,
presumption against termination of parental rights will govern.
3. Trial <s=*395(5)
Findings of fact must embody sufficient detail and include enough subsidiary
facts to clearly show the evidence on which
they are grounded. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
52(a).
4. Appeal and Error <3»1008.1(1)
Court of Appeals will grant deference
to fact finder only when findings of fact
are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evia different footing from the correction of an
error in a conviction." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88.
This distinction pertains to this case because
defendant contends not that his sentence is illegal but that his conviction was erroneous.
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dentiary basis for the court's decision.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a).
5. Appeal and Error <3»757(3)
Appellant need not go through the futile exercise of marshalling evidence when
findings are so inadequate that they cannot
be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations; appellant can simply argue
the legal insufficiency of the findings as
framed.
6. Infants e=»210
Trial court's findings of fact in support
of termination of noncustodial father's parental rights were inadequate, though constituting three pages of text, where most
of the "findings" were conclusory and
more akin to conclusions of law, and provided no insight into the evidentiary basis
for the trial court's decision. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 52(a).
7. Appeal and Error <s=>1106(5)
Unless record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports trial court's decision, absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 52(a).
8. Infants e=»254
Affirmance of noncustodial father's
parental rights as a matter of law was
impossible, thus requiring remand where
findings of fact were inadequate, where
there was conflicting testimony about matters such as frequency and duration of
father's visits with the child, his treatment
of the child during those visits, and custodial mother's attempts to prevent father
from visiting with the child.
John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before JACKSON, ORME, and
RUSSON, JJ.
1. Such a provision is not terribly helpful to
parties, like these, whose breakup is accompanied by considerable rancor.

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellant appeals the juvenile court's
terminating his parental rights in
son
- f Appellant challenges the juve
court's findings of fact insofar as t
purportedly support a determination
abandonment. We reverse and remand
more detailed findings.
der

FACTS
Appellee Kim Woodward and appelli
Richard Cameron Fazzio met in 1985 a
began living together in August of tl
year. In September of 1986, Woodws
gave birth to the parties' son. Thi
months later, Woodward and Fazzio part
pated in a marriage ceremony. Howev
at the time of the ceremony Woodward w
already married to another man. As
result, when the union between Woodwa
and Fazzio was terminated, annulment w
the method employed. The decree of a
nulment gave Woodward custody of tl
child, subject to reasonable visitation 1
Fazzio "as the parties can agree." * Aft
approximately two years under this a
rangement, during which time Fazz
claims Woodward repeatedly attempted i
prevent him from contacting the child, Fa
zio petitioned the district court to amer
the decree to provide for specific visitatioi
Woodward responded with a petition to te
minate Fazzio's parental rights and a m<
tion to transfer the same to juvenile cour
The transfer was granted, and the petitio
was heard by the juvenile court in Augus
of 1990. The court granted Woodward'
petition, ruling Fazzio's conduct constitute
abandonment of the child. This determina
tion was accepted by the district court
On appeal, Fazzio challenges the correct
ness of four of the juvenile court's finding
of fact.2 Those findings, in pertinent part
provide:
2. Fazzio sets forth three additional issues oi
appeal. These arguments are wholly withou
merit and we decline to address them. See, e.g.
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989)
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(#7) Petitioner and Respondent separated for the last time on September 10,
1987, and Respondent has failed to make
a serious effort to see the minor child,
since that time.
It is evident to the court that the natural father has abdicated his responsibility
as a parent to said child. He has absented himself, for various and sundry reasons, from the Child's life.
His contacts with the child have been
inconsistent, sporadic and token
[T]he father's contact with the child has
been minimal and only when his parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, had the child.
The father testified to frequent contacts and visits with the child, usually
when in the care of the paternal grandparents, but, on more than one occasion,
the father's testimony was directly impeached rendering his testimony less reliable and trustworthy. Indeed, there is
credible and believable testimony that
the child does not know Richard Cameron Fazzio as his father.
The court is convinced that the father's
conduct has led to the destruction of the
parent/child relationship.
(# 8) During the period of the parties'
separation, and since the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987)
Respondent has paid no child support to
Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the
minor child.

(# 11) [Respondent] . . . was emotionally abusive to the minor child, who is
the subject of this action.
LAW GOVERNING TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987) provides the mechanism by which termination
of parental rights may be effected. Since,
in the instant case, the termination is based
solely on abandonment, we begin our
analysis by identifying the elements necessary to establish that condition.3 The statutory abandonment provision reads as follows:
(1) The court may decree a termination
of all parental rights with respect to one
or both parents if the court finds either
(a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows:
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or
parents, although having legal custody
of the child, have surrendered physical
custody of the child, and for a period of
six months following the surrender have
not manifested to the child or to the
person having the physical custody of
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for
the care of the child;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987).

(# 10) Subsequent to the birth of the
said child, Respondent had the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the
minor child, but he failed to do so in
order to prevent the State of Utah or
other persons or agencies from requiring
him to meet his financial obligations as a
parent.

[1,2] Only for a custodial parent may a
"prima facie" showing of abandonment be
established as set forth in subsection (b).
State ex rel T.E. v. S.R, 761 P.2d 956, 958
(Utah App.1988). But abandonment by a
non-custodial parent like Fazzio, as well as
a custodial parent, "may also be found
where conduct on the part of the parent
'implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the parent-child
relationship/ " Id. (quoting State ex rel.

3. Under the statute, termination is permitted by
a clear and convincing showing of: (1) parental
unfitness or incompetence; (2) abandonment of
the child; (3) refusal or failure to properly care
for the child during an at-home trial period; or

(4) failure to communicate with the child for a
penod of one year, without just cause. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct.
1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), In re K.S.,
737 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1987).
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Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560
p.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977)). See State ex
rel J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234,1236
(Utah App.1988). The Wulffenstein test
for determining abandonment in termination proceedings requires proof of two
elements. First, the party seeking termination must prove that "the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for
his or her parental obligations" to the child.
Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the
party must demonstrate that the "disregard led to the destruction of the parentchild relationship."4 Id.;
Wulffenstein,
560 P.2d at 334. Both of these elements
must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71
L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1983).
FINDINGS GENERALLY
[3] Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P., provides
that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereo n — " s Utah appellate courts "consistently stress" the importance of adequate
"findings of fact." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d
1296, 1300 (Utah App.1991). To succeed in
challenging the findings, appellant must
prove they are clearly erroneous, i.e.,
against the clear weight of the evidence.
State ex rel J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d
1234, 1236 (Utah App.1988). Therefore, if
we are to determine whether the evidence
adduced at trial supports the trial court's
findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and include enough subsidiary
facts to clearly show the evidence upon
which they are grounded. See Acton v.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987);
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah

1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979). Absent adequate findings of fact, meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,
771 (Utah App.1990).
Pazzio, in his brief and at oral argument,
characterized his appeal as a challenge to
the trial court's factual findings. Accordingly, he attempted to marshal the evidence, as is required for such a challenge.
See In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). However,
the marshaling effort was largely ineffectual by reason of the conclusory nature of
the trial court's findings of fact
[4,5] "The process of marshaling the
evidence serves the important function of
reminding litigants and appellate courts of
the broad deference owed to the fact finder
at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732,739
(Utah App.1990). However, we will only
grant this deference when the findings of
fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the court's decision.
See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial court
decision afforded no deference when findings inadequate). See also Allred v.
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.
1990) (failure to enter detailed findings concerning child support determination constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion).
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant
to marshal the evidence when the findings
are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words, the way to
attack findings which appear to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is
to marshal the supporting evidence and
then demonstrate the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where
the findings are not of that caliber, appel-

4. Concern for the child's best interest is manipresumption against termination will govern.
fested in the second prong of the Wulffenstein
See In re IP., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982);
abandonment test: there is a strong presumpIn re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Utah 1981);
tion that a child is better off in the care of its
State ex rel M.W.H. v. Aguitar, 794 P.2d 27, 29
natural parents, or at least having some rela(Utah App.1990).
tionship with its natural parents, and absent
clear and convincing evidence that the parent's 5. The rule is applicable to juvenile proceedings.
disregard for his or her obligations caused a
See In re N.H.B., 111 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.),
destruction of the parent-child relationship, the
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
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lant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's
findings as framed. As explained in the
next section, whatever may be said of the
extent to which the trial court's intended
findings lack evidentiary support, the more
immediate problem in this case is the inadequacy of the findings.
INADEQUACY OF TRIAL COURTS
FINDINGS OF FACT
[6] Although the trial court's findings
of fact constitute a full three pages of text,
they nonetheless provide an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the
court's ultimate decision. Most of the
"findings" are conclusory, and reflect an
intention to merge the trial court's ultimate
factual determinations with the requirements of the Wulffenstein test, and as
such are more akin to conclusions of law.
See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299-1301. Finding
of Fact # 7, for instance, states that "[appellant's] contacts with the child have been
inconsistent, sporadic and token," that "it
is evident to the court that the natural
Father has abdicated his responsibility as a
parent," and that "the court is convinced
that the father's conduct has led to the
destruction of the parent/child relationship." These conclusory statements provide no insight into the evidentiary basis
for the trial court's decision and render
effective appellate review unfeasible.6 See
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5-6
(Utah Ct.App.1991). The issue before the
court was whether Fazzio had abandoned
R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings should
have set forth specific /acts—subsidiary
facts—bearing on that issue. The conclusory statements in Findings of Fact # 7, 8,
6. Taking, for example, the court's statement that
appellant's contacts with the child have been
"token," the court obviously had in mind some
number or range of contacts appellant had with
the child. But such a finding is problematic.
Does the court have in mind one contact over a
three-year period or ten contacts over a oneyear period? A reviewing court would possibly
agree that the former is "token," but disagree
that the latter is. However, without knowing
what the trial court had in mind, to affirm

10, and 11 do not provide this information
and are therefore inadequate.
[7] Unless the record "clearly and uncontrovertedly supports]" the trial court's
decision, the absence of adequate findings
of fact ordinarily requires remand for more
detailed findings by the trial court 7 Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. See also Lovegren,
798 P.2d at 770-71 (remand necessary
when facts disputed). But see State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n. 6 (Utah
1991) (suggesting same liberalization of Acton's requirement of express findings even
absent uncontroverted evidence).
[8] We have canvassed the record in
the instant case and find disputed evidence,
making affirmance as a matter of law impossible. Cf Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.
10 (absence of adequate findings is harmless when facts eoraermftg an issue axe
undisputed). There was conflicting testimony about the frequency and duration of
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment
of the child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from
visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of
child support, and Fazzio's provision of
gifts to the chUd—all facts crucial to the
validity of the court's ultimate decision that
Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the parentchild relationship. See Adams, 821 P.2d at
6 ("When multiple conflicting versions of
the facts create a matrix of possible factual
findings, we are unable on appeal to assume that any given finding was in fact
made.").
The trial court's findings of fact should
resolve these conflicts unequivocally, by
stating the specific subsidiary facts as the
trial court found them. The findings
should set forth, with as much precision as
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited
the child during particular periods; the
would be to defer to the court's legal conclusion,
as though a matter of fact, without being able to
evaluate its correctness against particular facts.
7. Otherwise, this court would be placed in the
awkward position of having to speculate about
what the court actually determined the facts to
be, without benefit of the guidance that proper
factual findings are meant to provide.
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length of each of the visits; the number of
visits Woodward intentionally prevented;
the sums Pazzio provided as child support,
either personally or through his parents;
the number and type of gifts Fazzio gave
to the child and the occasions on which he
gave them; and the specific statements,
acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's intent to either accept or disregard his
obligations as a parent (e.g., instances of
appellant performing child care functions
like changing his diaper or feeding him,
denying that the child was his responsibility, etc.).
Further, the findings should explicitly
address the impact Woodward's frequent
relocation had on Fazzio's ability to maintain contact with the child,8 the effect Fazzio's living and working outside Utah had
on his visitation,9 the manner and effect of
any refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his paternity, and any other
factors bearing on whether Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to such an
extent that the parent-child relationship
was destroyed.10 The court's findings as to
these issues should be set forth specifically
and should correspond to the factual evidence upon which the court relied.
Once we possess this information, we can
meaningfully evaluate whether the visits
have been sporadic, the child support payments insufficient, Fazzio's conduct unacceptable, and, ultimately, whether Fazzio
abandoned the child. Accordingly, we remand for more detailed findings by the
trial court.
"We do not intend our remand to be
merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached."
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah
1990). This court is not altogether confident that the trial court's final decision was
8. The record indicates that from the time the
decree of annulment was entered until trial,
Woodward had moved in with her mother, then
into her own apartment, then to Coalville,
Springville, Riverton, West Jordan, and back to
Coalville.
9. The record indicates Fazzio was employed in
Wyoming and Nevada for periods of time after
the decree was entered and maintained residences in those states.
823P24--12

correct, particularly since the action to terminate Fazzio's parental rights was commenced by Woodward in response to Fazzio's petition for specific visitation. The
timely assertion of such a petition by Fazzio is hardly the conduct of a disinterested
parent
JACKSON, J., concurs.
RUSSON, J., concurs in the result
J*\
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LeBARON & ASSOCIATES,
INC., Plaintiff,
v.
REBEL ENTERPRISES, INC,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
INC., Third-Party Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 910120-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 18, 1991.
Manufacturer, by third-party counterclaim, asserted contract action to recover
from dealer money allegedly owed under
authorized dealer agreement Judgment
for manufacturer was entered by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth
Rigtrup, J., and dealer appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ.,
*
10. For example, the court seems to have discounted visits Fazzio had with his son while the
son was in the company of Fazzio's parents.
Especially given the animosity between Woodward and Fazzio, and Woodward's apparent
preference for dealing with Fazzio's parents, no
reason immediately suggests itself for why Fazzio's visits with the child during time the child
spent with his paternal grandparents should not
"count" in Fazzio's favor.

